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ABSTRACT 
 
This study lies in the field of knowledge management (KM) which has been formally 
established as a discipline in 1990s to achieve organizational objectives by making the 
best use of knowledge. Knowledge is critically important because it is regarded as 
fundamental source for value creation and competitive advantages in the rapidly 
proliferating knowledge-based economy. KM facilitates decision-making, builds learning 
culture, and improves organizational performance ultimately.  
 
Conventional KM approaches are neither effective nor capable to handle growing 
complexities and unfathomability due to three inadequacies, namely ignorance of the 
environmental uncertainties, negligence of human bounded rationality, and missing 
micro-macro links for gaining holistic picture and understanding causalities on 
evolutionary and emergence perspectives.  
 
To overcome the limitations, primary goals of this study aim at developing a methodology 
for evolutionary and behavioral KM which has not yet be attempted in the past; 
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elucidating the microscopic KM impact on the macroscopic organizational outcomes; and 
evaluating KM policies with a consideration of environmental uncertainty and agents’ 
bounded rationality. Additional goals are to demonstrate the practicability of the 
methodology, to induce a KM incentive system as an administrative KM strategy, to 
investigate how social interaction and interdependency of agents impact the 
organizational outcomes, and to explore various administrative interventions and 
corresponding effectiveness. Hence, it paves the way for establishing a new field of study 
on evolutionary and behavioral KM ultimately.  
 
In this study, a basic KM game concerning environmental uncertainty and human 
bounded rationality as well as an extended KM game concerning incentive system and 
social interactions are developed accordingly then implemented in agent-based 
simulation and behavioral experiments iteratively. In the basic KM game, agents have to 
solve problems and strike for better performance strategically under an uncertain 
environment by choosing either Innovation (creating new knowledge independently) or 
Imitation (acquiring shared knowledge through establishing social networks). The 
productivity of innovation and connectivity of social network are exogenous 
administrative KM policies, whereas the probability of choosing each KM strategy is 
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adjusted overtime by agents’ endogenous adaptive learning. In the extended KM game, 
an incentive system is induced as administrative policy. Agents strategically make KM 
decisions under two dilemmas, namely loss aversion vs. risk seeking and competition or 
cooperation. Agents need to choose strategically between the maintenance of individual 
competitive advantage and optimization of collective outcomes. Overall, besides the 
emergent macroscopic organizational performance and structure, research findings also 
suggest a non-monotonicity on organizational long-term steady-state performance 
alongside the enhancement of social network connectivity, a scarcity heuristic on agent’s 
decision making, and various administrative incentive interventions that are suitable for 
optimizing particular situations coping with agents’ endogenous social interactions. 
Moreover, the most cost-effective intervention which motivates the individual to create 
more knowledge, unleash the innovation potential, while keeps a good cooperative 
culture has been identified.  
 
This study is the first of its kind combining ABM simulation with behavioral experiments 
in the KM literature. The developed integrated methodology is capable in dealing with 
growing complexity, elucidating causal relationships, and offering a pragmatic platform 
for policy-makers to design and test the effectiveness of interventions and gain 
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administrative insights without sacrificing overhead cost and cause panic or interruptions 
to daily operation.  
 
In the future, the KM game will be further improved by incorporating the freewill, 
learning, and adaptation of the administrator, hence the co-evolution between the 
organization and member agents can be realized. Furthermore, the knowledge should 
enhance agents’ cognition, behavior, and performance, meanwhile agents should re-shape, 
reuse, and renew the knowledge, whereas the organization whether through the 
administrator or itself should actively adjust the conditions that facilitate the dynamics 
and growth, so that the co-construction of the reality among knowledge, agents, and the 
organization will also be possibly achieved. By then, theory will be advanced, 
methodology will be sophisticated, and applications will be abundant.  
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides an overview of the thesis. It introduces the knowledge management 
(KM) as a self-contained discipline in organizational studies. Three major limitations of 
the conventional approaches have been pinpointed that ignite the future KM direction, 
especially on coping with the growing complexity and environmental uncertainty, human 
behaviours, and micro-macro links in a social organization. The research motivation 
arises as an attempt to tackle problems identified in a scientific and pragmatic manner by 
proposing an integrated KM approach. The significance of the study is also highlighted. 
At the end of this chapter, the organization of the thesis is presented.  
 
1.1 Background of the Study 
In the knowledge-based theory of organization, knowledge replaces labor and capital as 
fundamental resources for competitive advantage and value creation (Andriessen, 2004; 
Addicott et al., 2006), not only for organizations, but also for nations and regions (Toffler, 
1990; Drucker, 1993). Knowledge Management (KM) has been formally established as a 
multi-disciplinary field of study in 1991 for achieving organizational purposes by making 
the best use of knowledge (Nonaka, 1991).  
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1.2 Problem Statements 
Due to the advancement of information technology, the growing social interactions, 
turbulent environment, and shortening of knowledge life cycles have contributed to the 
growing complexity and uncertainty of the workplace and put great pressure on 
administrators for establishing tailored-made KM policies that can effectively optimize 
the organizational outcomes. The Delphi Group offered survey evidence of the fast 
growing complexity that common organizations face (Delphi Group, 2012). The survey 
indicates a dramatic change in the characteristics of knowledge work and increasing 
complexity causes uncertainties for decision-making in today’s knowledge economy. It 
also implies great opportunity on utilizing complexity for boosting performance 
advantage. Fully grasping the whole picture of the knowledge creation and diffusion is 
indeed a very difficult task due to human cognitive limitations. Many KM initiatives are 
unsuccessful because of the failure to identify the systemic determinants, interdependency, 
or causality. 
KM has been fueled by methodologies such as questionnaire survey, observation and 
interviews, sense-making narratives, case studies and social network analysis. Numerous 
advanced data and information technologies or decision support systems (DSS), e.g. 
expert systems, also support knowledge workers’ daily operation in organizations. 
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Difficulties have been identified in both theory advancement and industrial applications 
for linking KM with organizational outcomes under a complex and uncertain environment. 
Specifically what microscopic efforts lead to the macroscopic phenomena, how it is 
evolved overtime through social interactions, and what conditions that create unexpected 
results are unknown. For conventional approaches, content-orientation and technological 
precision are over-emphasized than overall managerial effectiveness. Technology is 
particularly suitable for offering practical solutions to boost productivity as a part of the 
whole. It does not consider the systemic reactions, environmental turbulence, feedbacks 
or consequences. It is just like replacing a better heart in the body, claiming to be more 
efficient in plumping blood, but it may be harmful to the body or causing side-effect. The 
theoretical or scientific aspect of KM is still inadequate. Additionally, approaches which 
address human behavior aspect of KM and how aggregate individual behaviors are 
amplified over time through social interactions via systemic micro-macro links are barely 
found in the KM literature (Alavi and Leidner, 2001; Liao, 2003; Kakabadse et al., 2003; 
Kane et al., 2005; and Xu et al., 2008; and Nemani, 2009). Moreover, the perturbation is 
unavoidable in conventional approaches. For example, when researchers conduct the 
investigation in the organization, the daily operation is interrupted, undesired panic and 
stress is introduced upon employees, and the purpose of study maybe wrongly interpreted. 
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In other words, the ways by which data are collected, analysed and evaluated in 
conventional methodologies can be highly perceptual, subjective, and often political since 
the traditional approach ignores the holistic alignment with organisational objectives 
when selecting only a few processes for examination. This is why human are unable to 
see the complex reality of KM in a clear and holistic manner. Hence, the results can be 
highly unreliable. Meanwhile, in order to capture the complexity of the organizational 
KM, conventional approaches cost intensive manpower and long time. Therefore, they 
are neither adequate nor efficient. When dealing with complexity, old linear ways of 
seeing things are dangerous. A pioneer in education Jörg (2004) argues that complexity 
theory and system thinking may be helpful to escape from the old ideas and blind spots 
of social sciences and system science, and build up a new science – a science which may 
be of help in dealing with the complexity of reality as we may view it and experience it 
in the practice of knowledge interaction. 
In summary, three major limitations are identified in conventional KM approaches that 
are of great interst in this study:  
(1) Limitation in coping with growing complexity and environmental uncertainty in a 
holistic manner and explaining the non-linear causality.  
(2) Limitation on ignorance of the human behavioral KM decisions  
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(3) Limitation on missing micro-macro links and consequences  
 
1.3 Research Opportunities and Motivation  
To overcome the limitations and tap into the complexity paradigm for next generation 
KM development in a holistic manner, the newly and rapidly popularized agent-based 
simulation is considered to be a promising solution. An agent-based model (ABM) is a 
computer model for simulating autonomous agents and assessing the system as a whole 
based on the generated effects from agents’ interactions. ABM is a kind of microscale 
model (Gustaffsson and Sternad, 2010) that is used in simulating the simultaneous 
operations and interactions of multiple agents in an attempt to re-create and predict the 
appearance of complex phenomena. ABM offers the possibility of modeling individual 
heterogeneity, representing explicitly agents’ adaptive rules for decision making, 
generating social interaction and evolution, and situating agents in a geographical or 
another type of space (Gilbert, 2008). Its favorable features include modularity, great 
flexibility, large expressiveness and possibility to execute in a parallelized way (Taber 
and Timpone, 1996). Therefore, it fits the niche when simulating an organization as a 
complex adaptive system and examining the KM evolution are desired.  
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1.4 Research Objectives 
The ultimate goal is to stablish a new field of study on evolutionary and behavioral KM 
for organization, especially on tackling the growing complexity and uncertainty. To pave 
the way for this goal, the primary objectives of this research are:  
(1) To develop a methodology for evolutionary and behavioral KM;  
(2) To elucidate the microscopic KM impact on macroscopic organizational outcomes;  
(3) To evaluate KM policy with environmental uncertainty and agents’ bounded 
rationality.  
To be specific and concrete, a basic KM game that extracts the essence of the microscopic 
agents’ KM behaviors and social interactions with endogenous freewill, incorporates 
exogenous administrative KM policy interventions, and link the organization with 
environmental uncertainty is to be developed; it will be then implemented in both agent-
based simulation and behavioral experiments for obtaining static and dynamics, results; 
and some implications from the findings will be discussed. In addition to the development 
of the basic KM game, this study also aims at extending the work with an inducement of 
an incentive system and freewill for social interactions. Therefore, the additional 
objectives of this research are:  
(1) To establish a conceptual framework for the inducement of incentive system under 
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two dilemmas namely: loss aversion vs. risk seeking and competition vs. cooperation 
for preserving and promoting diversity;   
(2) To investigate how social interactions and interdependencies of agents impact on 
organizational outcomes;  
(3) To explore various administrative interventions and evaluate the effectiveness 
accordingly.  
1.5 Originality and Significance  
This research work is the first of its kind combing agent-based simulation with behavioral 
experiments in the KM discipline. It offers a powerful and rigorous methodological 
alternative to cope with growing complexity that conventional approaches are unable to. 
It delivers descriptive and prescriptive outcomes including state and dynamics, long term 
and short term development, evolution and behaviors, etc., for organizational policy 
makers to experiment administrative interventions, forecast consequences, generate 
unforeseeable emergence, and evaluate the managerial effectiveness easily. It serves as a 
roadmap that make the cause and effect more understandable, hence, new organizational 
theories can be derived. In summary, this study bridges the theoretical, methodological, 
and practical gap in the KM literature.  
 
8 
 
1.6 Organization of the Thesis  
The dissertation consists of seven chapters. Chapter One outlines the background of the 
study, problem statements, research objectives, and originality of the work. Chapter Two 
firstly reviews the literature of knowledge management as a self-contained discipline and 
secondly extends the notion with complexity theory, behavioral economics, and micro-
macro link sociology theory towards a transdisciplinary development. Then the integrated 
KM approach is proposed and the research roadmap is presented in Chapter Three 
depicting a holistic organization KM as a complex adaptive system. In Chapter Four, the 
basic KM game is presented, the implementation in both ABM simulation and behavioral 
experiments are explained in details, results elucidate the microscopic KM effort impact 
on macroscopic outcomes under both exogenous KM policy and environmental 
influences; non-monotonicity in steady-state organizational performance alongside the 
enhancement of social network connectivity; and scarcity heuristic on agents’ KM 
decision-making are revealed. In Chapter Five, the extended KM game is developed with 
an inducement of a KM incentive system to explore how agents strategically make KM 
decisions under two dilemmatic scenarios, namely loss aversion vs. risk seeking and 
competition or cooperation, and to investigate how the social interaction and 
interdependency of agents impact the organizational outcomes. Likewise, the extended 
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KM game is implemented in behavioral experiments then preliminarily prototyped in the 
ABM simulation. Chapter Six discusses the advantages of the integrated KM 
methodology, and how it can particularly serve the purpose of coping with growing 
complexity, environmental uncertainty, human bounded rationality, micro-macro links, 
and incentive system design. Last but not least, Chapter Seven concludes the dissertation 
by summarizing the achievements, highlighting the significance and impact, and 
suggesting possible opportunities for future work. 
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this chapter, the related literature concerning the research work is reviewed. The topics 
and concepts include: The general notion of organizational knowledge and knowledge 
management (KM); KM discipline development and evolution; Transdisciplinary KM 
with complexity theory, behavioral economics theory, and micro-macro link sociological 
theory. Then an integrated KM approach . It lays a theoretical foundation on the solution 
proposed in this study for overcoming the limitations and creating a paradigm shift for 
new KM study.  
 
 Organizational Knowledge Management  
2.1.1 The Notion of Knowledge  
In the knowledge-based view of the firm or the knowledge-based theory of organization 
(Conner, 1991; Demsetz, 1988; Conner and Prahalad, 1996; Kogut and Zander, 1992, 
1996; Madhok 1996; Grant 1997; Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998; and Nickerson and 
Zenger, 2004), knowledge has replaced land, natural resources and labor as the ultimate 
source of value creation, and competitive advantages (Addicott et al., 2006; Lytras, 2006). 
The statement is also applicable for larger social systems like nations and regions (Toffler, 
1990; Drucker, 1993). Although there is a great debate on defining knowledge as shown 
11 
 
in Table 2-1, from various researchers, it can be seen that knowledge is considered either 
as information that has been analyzed and organized for solving problems and, making 
decisions or a set of insights, beliefs, experience, and judgments. Meanwhile Davenport 
and Prusak (1998) held a view that can integrate two perspectives, which is “knowledge 
is a fluid mix of framed experience, values, contextual information, and expert insight 
that provides a framework for evaluating and incorporating new experience and 
information”. It habitudes not only in documents or repositories but also in organizational 
routines, processes, practices, culture and norms.  
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Table 2-1 Summary of Knowledge Definitions 
 
 
Liebowtiz and Beckman (1998) categorizes knowledge into three kinds: explicit, implicit 
and explicit. Explicit knowledge is often retained into formal and structured knowledge 
sources and is easily obtained and organized. Implicit knowledge is consider as being 
accessible through inquiry and discussion. Tacit knowledge is hidden in the human mind 
and consciousness which is accessible indirectly through practice, knowledge elicitation 
and observation of behavior. Further development suggests that knowledge can be 
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generally classified into two categories: explicit knowledge and tacit knowledge (Nonaka 
and Konno, 1999). Explicit knowledge is knowledge that can be codified. It is easy to 
share and transfer between individuals and groups, whereas tacit knowledge is personal 
knowledge including skills, experience, know-how, intuition, and insights that are 
difficult to be formalized or shared among groups. Explicit knowledge includes databases, 
images, documents, guidelines, manuals and procedures. Knowledge sharing of explicit 
knowledge can be realized through communication. According to Nonaka (1994), tacit 
knowledge has both cognitive and technical perspectives. Cognitive perspectives are 
reflected by mental models in which people form concepts of the world, whereas technical 
elements can be expressed as know-how or skills. Knowledge sharing of tacit knowledge 
is comparatively more difficult than explicit knowledge, but it can be realized through a 
conversion into explicit knowledge first (Becerra-Fernandez and Sabhewal, 2001). 
Knowledge is abstract, vague, and difficult to quantify or measure, yet important to 
manage. Organizations must efficiently and effectively manage organizational knowledge 
in order to create intellectual capital and sustain competitive advantage (Hall, 1993; 
Powell & Dent-Micallef, 1997; Rumisen, 1998; Saka, 2002; Zack, 1999; Carroll & Tansey, 
2000). 
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2.1.2 Knowledge Management (KM) 
In the late nineteenth century, industrial practitioners and academic researchers started 
recognizing the significance of organizational knowledge, knowledge work and 
knowledge workers (Drucker, 1959; Popper, 1963; Polanyi, 1976). The term “Knowledge 
management” is firstly introduced by Karl-Erik Sveiby (1986) in his book “Knowledge 
companies” and Karl Wiig (1986) in an important KM article. Roughly at the same time, 
a Japanese veteran business guru, Ikujiro Nonaka, published a ground-breaking book in 
1991 named The Knowledge-Creating Company (Nonaka, 1991). Since then, knowledge 
has increasingly become an important means for value creation and the most critical factor 
of competitiveness (Drucker, 1993; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Bogdanowitz and Bailey, 
2002; Davenport, 2005; Mcdermott, 2005; Cooper, 2006; Tapscott, 2006). KM is seen 
today as a transdisciplinary practices (Wallace, 2007) and enables organizations to make 
the best use of knowledge.  
However, there is no universal consensus on how KM should be defined. Different 
researchers hold different points of view of KM (Table 2-2). This is because KM is 
indeed rooted in and emerged from many disciplines.  
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Table 2-2 Summary of KM Definitions 
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2.1.3 The Evolution of KM  
Tracing back the origin of KM, it is generally considered that KM has gone through three 
major generations focusing different aspects (Snowden, 2002; Koenig, 2002; 
Vorakulpipat et al., 2006; Dixon, 2010; Rezgui et al., 2010). KM pioneers state that the 
first generation of KM focuses heavily on documents: leveraging explicit knowledge by 
building knowledge repositories or expert systems; the second generation of KM tends to 
promote tacit-explicit knowledge conversion and focuses more on people and experience; 
and the third generation of KM focuses on the complex system of collective interactions, 
organizational learning and innovation capacities (Snowden, 2002; Dixon, 2010). Figure 
2-1 and Table 2-3 summarize the evolution and characteristics of the three generations 
of KM. 
 
Figure 2-1 Overview of KM Evolution (Dixon, 2010) 
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Table 2-3 The KM Evolution  
(http://i-p-k.co.za/wordpress/allowing-human-ingenuity-to-unfold/a-conceptual-
framework-of-the-evolution-of-knowledge-management/) 
 
 
2.1.4 KM Current Challenges and Key Issues 
Firstly, it is recognized that the dramatic changes in working patterns have introduced 
great challenges and constraints to the contemporary KM practices. Nature of work in 
organizations changes from simple, routine, and individual work to complex, emergent, 
and collaborative work (Nonaka & Toyama, 2005). Not long ago, hierarchies and 
structures were clear and of utmost importance at workplace. The work handling 
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procedures were well informed and the problem solving paths were seemingly obvious. 
The work processes and work flows were well defined and documented. The knowledge 
required for problem solving was known and straight-forward. Oppositely, knowledge 
work cannot be easily described and defined in a simple or static flow chart or process 
diagram any more. The knowledge created at workplace grows immense, and shared with 
others through complex social network. Knowledge workers are required to be fast 
learners and act strategically in order to keep up the performance and social position. The 
implication of such trend is that organizations are no longer mechanistic entities but 
networks of complex and interdependent communities towards an organic development. 
However, conventional approaches are no longer capable in helping administrative 
policy-makers making KM strategies that work. The challenges fall on the resolution of 
dealing with the complex nature of the new generation of KM, e.g. non-linear causality, 
emergence, feedback loops, uncertainty, etc. How to gain a whole picture of what is 
happening in the office, how to understand phenomena and harness the complexity in a 
good way that favors the organization becomes a key issue in the new agenda of the future 
KM. Although better management of knowledge could bring along great benefit, many 
KM programs have failed. The Chief Knowledge Officer (CKO) at international 
management and technology consulting firm Booz-Allen and Hamilton has suggested that 
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up to 84 % of all knowledge management programs fail (Philip, 2003). According to 
Hylton (2002a, 2002b), the reason why KM initiatives go wrong is the failure to identify 
the knowledge needs, inability to clearly grasp the whole system, or the effectiveness of 
KM initiatives only can be analyzed in hindsight.  
 
Secondly, a lot of KM initiatives fail because of the ignorance of the human behaviors. 
For example, how individual allocate effort on either creating new knowledge or sharing 
knowledge from time to time, will most people hold cognitive bias towards some certain 
choice, will it always work for promoting high connectivity among knowledge workers 
and encourage no barriers for knowledge sharing, how little change in microscopic 
individual decision making on pursuing certain KM strategy affect the organizational 
outcome? These factors are critical as well. Unfortunately, the behavior-oriented KM is 
still missing in the literature and conventional approaches concerning individual 
behavioral decision-making are mostly qualitative and content-oriented, since the purpose 
is more on eliciting tacit experience. Failing to consider the individual and collective 
decision-making behavior on KM, the evaluation of KM policy effectiveness will highly 
unlikely be successful.  
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Thirdly, difficulty in gasping the whole picture of the organization in a holistic manner is 
indeed implying that there is a missing link between microscopic and macroscopic level. 
Conventional KM approaches briefly mentioned in the KM evolution seldom consider 
this micro-macro links. There are three major reasons: (1) no system thinking: problem 
or deficiencies are still treated as parts and micro-macro link is neglected; (2) any 
conventional KM initiatives when implemented, it takes a long time to see the 
effectiveness, hence, only short term benefit is valued; (3) some academic scholars using 
conventional KM approaches tend to avoid micro-macro link on purpose because it is 
always criticized that one cannot compare KM efforts with organizational performance 
directly since environmental factors cannot be ignored and its effect on the organizational 
performance is unknown and unquantifiable.  
 
In summary, the limitations of handling non-linear causality, unknown agent’s behaviors, 
growing complexity, uncertain environment, and the lack of a micro-macro links suggest 
an incommensurability (Kuhn, 1962) which will lead to a paradigm shift. New set of 
theories, methodologies, and practices is needed in coping with KM Complexity.  
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 Towards a Transdisciplinary KM  
2.2.1 KM on Complexity Theory 
Further enriching the third generation of KM as system oriented era of KM development, 
Snowden (2002) suggests that complex adaptive system theory is needed to create models 
that utilize self-organizing capabilities of the informal communities and identifies natural 
flow of knowledge creation, disruptive, and utilization because linear cause and effect are 
rarely found among knowledge exchange activities in organizations any more. Thus, a 
new paradigm of complexity has emerged. It would be inadequate or even dangerous if 
we still use our old way of linear thinking in KM. A pioneer education scholar Jörg argues 
that complexity theory may be helpful for us to escape the old ideas and the blind spots 
of social sciences and system science and to build up a new science – a science which 
may be of help of deal with the complexity of reality as we may view it and experience it 
in the very practice of knowledge interaction (Jörg, 2004). 
Complexity science is a fundamentally new way of looking at physical, biological, and 
social phenomena. It is a cross-disciplinary field with its own approach to knowledge 
creation, sharing and learning capability. Complexity science spans scales from particle 
fields to information mechanics (physical analysis of the dynamics of information 
transmission) and adaptive systems (learning and consciousness, including neural 
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systems), to human society, ecosystems and extraterrestrial space. In the literature, there 
is relatively little work on developing complex social systems theory than complex 
natural systems. Mitleton-Kelly (2003) stated ten principles of complexity and 
highlighted the generic characteristics of complex adaptive systems which include 
emergence, connectivity, interdependence, and feedback (Figure 2-2) This work offers 
an overview of the key indicators that can make complex system more understandable 
and describable.  
 
Figure 2-2 Principles of Complexity 
Complexity science is the study of complex systems which is a system having multiple 
interacting components, of which the overall behavior cannot be inferred simply from the 
behavior of components. The computational modeling and simulation methodology is 
considered appropriate to deal with complexity issue of social phenomena for a large 
variety of reasons. First of all, it is widely recognized that the non-linear dynamics of a 
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system are not mathematically tractable; whereas simulation is highly advantageous; 
Second, there is a desire to grow the system and create emergence from the bottom-up 
without introducing perturbation to the system; Third, computational analysis is 
particularly suitable for exploration of short-term and long-term phenomena. Finally, 
there is growing concerns about issues related to scalability which conventional methods 
are incapable, whereas simulation renders the ability to handle scalability. In addition to 
deduction and induction, simulation is sometimes seen as a third methodology for doing 
research. Even though simulation does not prove theorems, it can enhance our 
understanding of complex phenomena that have been out of reach for deductive theory.  
Agent-based modeling (ABM) is a new analytical and computational method for social 
sciences that allows one to create, analyze, and experiment with, artificial worlds 
populated by agents and permits them to study how rules of microscopic agents’ behavior 
give rise to the macroscopic regularities and organizations (Epstein and Axtell 1996; 
Axelrod 1997; Epstein 1999; Axtell 2000; Gilbert, 2008b). ABM is a kind of microscale 
model (Gustaffsson and Sternad, 2010) that is used in simulating the simultaneous 
operations and interactions of multiple agents in an attempt to re-create and predict the 
appearance of complex phenomena. ABM offers the possibility of modeling individual 
heterogeneity, representing explicitly agents’ adaptive rules for decision-making, 
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generating social interaction and evolution, and situating agents in a geographical or 
another type of space (Gilbert, 2008a). Its favorable features include modularity, great 
flexibility, large expressiveness and possibility to execute in a parallelized way (Taber 
and Timpone, 1996). It is particularly suitable for topics like decentralized decision 
making, self-organization, emergence, local-global interactions, and heterogeneity in a 
simulated system (Bandini et al, 2009) where macro phenomena are usually irreducible 
or fathomable. The characteristics of ABM include focusing on bottom-up autonomous 
interactions instead of top-down control, featuring a large number of heterogeneous 
agents instead of identical or dissimilar actors; assuming the environment is constantly 
changing and evolving instead of a fixed one; studying dynamics and transient trajectories 
far from equilibrium instead of studying equilibriums. Most ABMs consist of: (1) 
numerous agents specified at various scales; (2) decision-making heuristics; (3) learning 
rules or adaptive processes; (4) an interaction topology; and (5) a non-agent environment. 
Therefore, it fits to the niche when simulating an organization as a complex adaptive 
system and examining the KM evolution are desired. Nevertheless, there are notable 
limitations on ABM, such as the validity of the modeled human behavior, the difficulties 
in reasonable parameter calibration and model self-validation, etc. 
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2.2.2 KM on Behavior Economics Theory 
Personal knowledge management (PKM) was introduced in 1999 which refers to the 
management of knowledge at the individual level (Wright, 2005). However, the seminal 
work mainly studies processes that a person manages his/her knowledge in daily 
operation (Grundspenkis, 2007) and provides support to enhance individual growth and 
learning. Behavioral decision-making on KM processes, social learning preference, or 
other cognitive related factors have not yet been focused. The PKM is a bottom-up 
approach, however, it does not establish a micro-macro link, and therefore, how 
individual management knowledge that creates organizational value is still unknown. The 
current practice is still considered to be far behind and inadequate.  
On the contrary, this study aims at unfolding the bounded rationality, behavioral decision-
making on KM effort, social preferences and influences, and other factors at microscopic 
level. To be specific, how individuals behaviorally adjust the likelihood of choosing KM 
strategies throughout timespan and what KM policies lead to optimized collective 
performance considering the human nature are of primary concerns. Since Simon’s 
(1955) early work, evidence has shown that human decision making often falls short of 
the purely rational model (Haley and Stumpf, 1989). Instead of achieving rational 
decision making, they figure out efficient rules or mental shortcut to form judgements can 
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choices. On contrary with rational choice theory, other models focus on heuristics and 
cognitive biases (Kahneman et al., 1982; Schwenk 1988; Stevenson et al., 1990). 
Commonly, when people come across complex problem with limited knowledge and time, 
the application of biases and heuristics yields satisficing results to problems for agents in 
an effective and efficient manner. Many public policies and commercial policies without 
considering the behavioral reaction of the collection of people are doomed to fail.  
 
Behavioral economics investigates the effects of psychological, social, cognitive, and 
emotional factors on the economic decisions of individuals and institution and examines 
what results and consequences, such as returns and resources, will be realized. This field 
of study on the contrary with classic economics, is mainly concerned with bounded 
rationality of economic agents. It also is considered as a trans-discipline that combines 
psychology, neuroscience, and microeconomics theory. Designing and applying 
experiments with human subjects are common approaches for behavioral economists to 
study human behaviors since they help research understand how and why the economic 
agents or the social systems behave so.  
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2.2.3 KM on Micro-Macro Link Theory 
Macrosociology studies large-scale phenomena whereas microsociology attends to 
smaller-scale phenomena.  Macrosociology and microsociology have developed almost 
independently of one another. For long, the issue of how to link these disparate levels of 
analysis, how to close what is often termed the “micro-macro gap”, has been debated 
within theoretical sociology (Turner & Markovsky, 2007). Intuitively, it is relatively easy 
to bridge microscopic and macroscopic levels. However, it is indeed difficult to derive 
formal theories about micro-macro link or even construct conceptual framework clearly 
since the micro-macro gap is vague and two levels are influencing each other all the time.  
ABM has the advantage in bridging the micro-macro links and unfolding the black box 
non-linear causality due to its generative nature. If microscopic specifications are 
theoretically plausible, the model is based on solid empirical ground. If the simulation 
results are robust against simulation parameters, then the microscopic specifications are 
accepted to satisfy the criterion of “generative sufficiency”. ABM uses presuppose rules 
of behavior, allowing the effect of micromotive to be amplified into macrobehaviors. 
Agents’ local effort and decision-making can grow the collective outcomes through social 
networks and interactions. It also covers various exogenous or endogenous conditions 
that may alter the macroscopic outcomes. It consciously grows the collective system and 
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creates emergent patterns of behaviors. Overall, both qualitative and quantitative results 
can be produced. Hence, it is regarded as a possible and advantageous choice.  
 
 Towards an Integrated KM 
Through reviewing the relevant literature, an integrated KM approach is proposed as the 
possible solution to cope with complexity and overcome the limitation of the conventional 
approaches. The integrated approach composes of an agent-based simulation and a series 
of behavioral experiments with human participants. The ABM and behavioral 
experiments indeed are mutually beneficial to each other (Figure 2-3). There are notable 
limitations on applying ABM alone, such as the validity of the modeled human behavior, 
the difficulties in reasonable parameter calibration and model self-validation, etc. These 
limitations can be overcome by behavioral experiments. On one hand, in the physical 
science of complexity, difficulties are usually overcome by controlled experiments. On 
the other hand, in social science, the utilization of controlled behavioral experiments can 
also be applicable. Indeed, controlled behavioral experimentation is largely employed in 
psychology and socio-economics to understand human behaviors, strategic decision-
makings, interactive learning and social preferences. It also should be a powerful 
methodology in KM organizational studies. However, to produce statistically meaningful 
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results, millions of repetitions of experiments are required which can be extremely 
resources and time consuming; additionally, many influential variables of human traits 
are not feasibly to be controlled, e.g. preferences, freewill and optimistic or pessimistic 
mood, which may lead to systemic errors. While in the simulation, these experiment 
constraints can be easily eliminated. Therefore, it is argued that the only solution is the 
integration of agent-based simulation and behavioral experiments. 
 
Figure 2-3 ABM Simulation and Behavioral Experiments Relationship 
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CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH ROADMAP 
This chapter firstly presents the establishment of the research roadmap for 
achieving the objectives mentioned in the Chapter 1; secondly it articulates 
the design rationale of a basic KM game and an extended KM game which 
are regarded as abstract or toy models of complex organizational KM reality; 
thirdly it argues the inevitable choice of integrating ABM with behavioral 
experiments; lastly it explains the relationships between the basic KM game 
and the extended KM game.  
 
3.1 Research Roadmap 
In order to achieve the primary, additional, and ultimate goals mentioned in 
Chapter 1. A holistic research roadmap is depicted in Figure 3-1. In this study, 
organizational KM is considered as a complex adaptive system whose value 
creation is driven by member agents’ KM effort from the bottom-up. Similar 
with many well-established fields of study, e.g. Physics, Biology, or Economics, 
“toy models” or “abstract models” of the complex mechanism in the reality are 
often employed to address questions of interest. In this study, a basic KM 
game concerning the environmental uncertainty and an extended KM game 
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concerning the inventive system and social interactions are developed as toy 
models representing the organizational KM reality. Two games are targeting 
different aspects of the organization KM, hence some unnecessary features 
are turned off/isolated, for example, in the basic KM game, incentive system 
is excluded, whereas in the extended KM game, environmental conditions are 
turned off. Both games serve the purpose to understand the microscopic KM 
effort impact on the macroscopic outcomes and explore administrative 
interventions and their effectiveness.  
 
 
Figure 3-1 Research Roadmap 
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3.2 The Abstract or Toy Models  
The design rationale behind simplifying the organizational KM reality into 
two KM games is for better understand the causal relationships, interaction 
mechanism, and micro-macro links. The proposed games are considered as 
abstract or toy models that contain the ingredients that are necessary to 
address the questions of my research interest. An abstract/toy model 
abstracts the reality into a set of elements that essentially related to 
understand a particular mechanism. There are plenty of great examples of 
abstract/toy model that have largely enhanced our understanding of physical, 
biology, or economical world, such as the Ising model for understanding 
ferromagnetism and phase transition, cellular automata for studying pattern 
formation, prisoner dilemma and minority game for building game theory, 
and so on. The advantages of abstract/toy models include: for better elucidate 
complex causal mechanism, it allows isolation, in other words, irrelevant 
variables are excluded while only essential elements are retained; it is easy 
to manipulate and observe and it offers you the data that serves your purpose; 
and it is feasible to be conducted in laboratories and cost-effective in execution. 
There are always critiques about how abstract the model is regarded as 
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appropriate and how much validity it can claim if it is simplified. The 
proposed KM games do not aim at establishing a sophisticated one that serves 
general purpose and fully clone the reality, instead, they keep the necessary 
elements as minimum and as a conceptual representation of some phenomena. 
That is to say, someone else’s KM model addressing different issues may be 
essentially different. Only selecting two key KM processes – knowledge 
creation and sharing cannot claim to be the standard or anything fully 
realistic, because there are numerous other processes, but they are two 
essential processes without which there is no KM at all. The principle upheld 
in this study is to keep models as simple as possible particularly for the 
questions of interest of this study only.  
 
3.3 Integrated KM Methodology 
Evolutionary and behavioral KM are of great interest in this study. Hence, 
the ABM simulation and behavioral experiments are considered as desired 
options for methodological consideration. However, either method has 
limitations by applying alone. On one hand, the pros of ABM simulation are 
that it is good for optimization, long-term prediction, as well as rules or 
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parameters calibration which are not feasible by behavioral experiments. The 
cons of ABM simulation include that it lacks of an empirical ground for the 
validity and accuracy of behavior rules and parameter settings specified in 
the model. On the other hand, the pros of behavioral experiments include that 
the rich empirical observation and solid ground data can be gained, whereas 
the cons of behavioral experiments include that to produce statistically 
meaningful results, millions of repetitions are needed, in addition, many 
influential variables of human related traits are not feasibly controlled, for 
instance, social preferences, freewill, or mood, etc., which may cause systemic 
errors. Through ABM simulation, rough insights can be gained quickly, 
specific problem of large social system can be narrow down into concrete 
themes, and scope of the study can be decided easily. Hence, through 
integration, ABM and behavioral experiments complement each other. ABM 
serves as a guideline for behavioral experiments and expands the study 
capacity into larger scale and longer time for optimization, while behavioral 
experiments provide empirical ground and evidence to ABM.  Therefore, the 
integrated approach is considered as an inevitable and highly advantageous 
choice.  
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3.4 The Relationship between The Basic and Extended KM Games 
The basic KM game and the extended KM game center different study themes 
and interaction mechanisms. The basic KM game attempts to unfold the 
impact of environmental uncertainty on microscopic agents’ behavior and 
macroscopic organizational outcomes in the long run and reveal the human 
endogenous decision behaviors guided by bounded rationality at microscopic 
level when administrator implement exogenous KM policies. The extended 
KM game induces an administrative incentive system at macroscopic level 
with monetary reward and knowledge bonus to study the microscopic 
adaptive learning and social interactions of agents. The basic KM game 
targets more on system conditions and microscopic reasoning while the 
extended KM game focuses more on incentive stimulation at macroscopic 
level and social interactions and social interdependency at microscopic level. 
Both games are independent and self-contained investigations, meanwhile, 
they are complementing to each other for better understanding the micro-
macro links of the organizational KM and conditions that facilitate or inhibit 
optimization. 
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CHAPTER 4 THE BASIC KM GAME 
This chapter explains the basic KM game in details, in terms of the design of conceptual 
framework, the implementation, data gathering and analysis, and results comparison, etc. 
Firstly, the conceptual framework is presented; secondly, the game is elaborated again in 
ODD protocol which is considered as a well-recognized tool for model description and 
communication; thirdly, the basic KM game is implemented in both agent-based 
simulation and behavioral experiments. Data is generated in simulation and collected in 
the experiments. Both results are analyzed and compared. With empirical evidence gained 
from the experiments, agent-based model improvement is proposed and tested. The 
findings of the basic KM game are summarized at the end of this chapter.  
 
4.1 Conceptual Framework  
The basic KM game aims to study the evolutionary KM by agent-based simulation and 
the behavioral KM by behavioral experiments with human participants. Inspired by the 
knowledge diffusion through social network model developed by Chang & Harrington 
(2005), a conceptual framework of the basic KM game is designed and illustrated in 
Figure 4-1.  
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Figure 4-1 The Conceptual Framework of The Basic KM Game 
 
Overall, the organizational KM is considered as a complex adaptive system. The game 
contains three entities, namely the agent, the organization, and the task environment. 
Agent’s KM decision-making involves two stages: choosing KM strategy: innovation 
with an endogenous probability 𝑞𝑖(𝑡) or imitation with an endogenous probability 1 −
𝑞𝑖(𝑡) and choosing other people with an endogenous probability 𝑝𝑖
𝑗(𝑡). Knowledge 
creation and knowledge sharing are two essential processes on the problem-solving 
perspective (Nickerson and Zenger, 2004). Since the KM game will be implemented in 
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behavioral experiment and played by human participants, for easy explanation and 
understanding purpose, knowledge creation is labeled with innovation, and acquiring 
shared knowledge or knowledge sharing is labeled with imitation. This design claims no 
standard or accuracy of how KM should be. Indeed, there is no universal agreement on 
how KM, innovation, or imitation are precisely defined. It is the abstraction and isolation 
that are needed in the process of scientific modeling and are simple enough to serve the 
purpose of this study. There are two exogenous factors representing administrative KM 
policies at macroscopic level that are controlled by the policy maker for optimization 
purpose, namely the productivity of new knowledge with an exogenous probability 𝜇𝑖
𝑖𝑛 
and the connectivity of the social network with an exogenous probability  𝜇𝑖
𝑖𝑚 . The 
purposes are to enable the feedback loops or the micro-macro links, explore how 
exogenous KM policies affect endogenous individual decision-making behaviors, and 
identify what organizational outcomes are generated from the bottom-up under such 
conditions. Organizational decision behavior ?̅?  , emergent structure ?̅? , and 
organizational performance ?̅?  are measurements to evaluate the organizational 
outcomes on macroscopic level.  
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4.2 The ODD Protocol  
Design and Framework – The ODD Protocol 
ODD stands for Overview, Design concept, and Details. The ODD Protocol is 
one well-known tool to help researchers formulate and describe the ABM in a 
standardized and structuralized manner. It is developed by a large group of 
experienced researchers to create factual, complete, quick, easy, and 
consistent model descriptions (Grimm et al. 2006; Railsback and Grimm, 
2011). Although the proposed KM games developed in this study not only 
include an ABM but also behavioral experiments, it is still a good choice to 
use The ODD Protocol, since there are plenty of advantages of using ODD, for 
example, it helps researchers put scattered thoughts into a hierarchical 
roadmap and forces them to think further in a more detailed and concrete 
way；it explicitly communicates to the readers with all the information so the 
developed work can be re-implemented, replicated, and reproduced; and it 
provides a generic language that makes the complex model more intuitively 
understandable. Moreover, it is now rapidly gaining wide acceptance in the 
social science literature (Polhill et al., 2008). Therefore, the basic KM game 
and the extended KM game will be presented in the ODD format (Figure 4-2).  
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Figure 4-2 The ODD Protocol (Grimm et al., 2006) 
 
Overview – Purpose  
The purpose of the basic KM game is to study the adaptive behavior of knowledge 
workers’ KM effort at microscopic level and the impact on organizational outcomes at 
macroscopic level; and to elucidate the causal relations among exogenous KM policies, 
endogenous decision adjustment, environmental uncertainties, and human bounded 
rationality.  
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Overview – Entities, State Variables, and Scale 
There are three entities namely The Agent, The Organization, and The Environment. 
Agents reside in the organization that are characterized by groups they belong to, tasks 
for problem solving, KM strategies, probabilities of choosing the strategies, social 
network for searching other agents, probabilities of choosing other agents, adaptive 
learning ability, individual performance, and free will to choose strategies and people. 
The organization is characterized by administrative functions namely setting goal scope 
and dividing agents into groups, exogenous KM policies, collective decision behavior, 
emergent structure, and collective performance. The environment is characterized by the 
dynamic and uncertain problems to be solved by agents as tasks. In other words, the 
organization contains N individuals and adapts to its environment through KM effort. 
Each individual 𝑖 ∈  {1, 2, … , 𝑁} faces 𝐻 tasks. Corresponding to each task, there is a 
goal ?̂?𝑖(𝑡) that may change from period 𝑡 to period 𝑡 + 1, indicating the dynamics of 
the task environment. Goals may also be different among individuals, implying the 
diversity of tasks for each individual.  
Overview – Process Overview and Scheduling 
At each period 𝑡, each agent needs to receive a task assigned to them by the organization, 
they need to choose either to innovate or imitation, if the new knowledge helps them 
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improve individual performance, the probability of choosing the same KM strategy and 
the same knowledge worker (if imitation is chosen) will be updated, following that the 
organizational decision behavior, structure concentration, and collective performance 
measure will be evaluated and updated.  
Design Concepts – Emergence 
The organizational decision behavior, organizational structure, and the collective 
performance are emerged from the bottom-up based on agents’ KM effort and social 
interactions.  
Design Concepts – Adaptation  
Period by period, agents make adaptive decisions on choosing KM strategies and 
choosing other agents who share out their knowledge to improve the individual 
performance. Hence, the collective individuals can move closer and closer to the 
environment and task goals. The organization based on different environmental 
conditions can search for optimized exogenous KM policies. However, this search is 
based on steady-state outcome comparisons, instead of dynamical search.  
Design Concepts – Objectives  
Agents are striking for better individual performance through their adaptive decisions on 
KM effort.  
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Design Concepts – Learning  
Agents are learning from past actions. They will see at the end of each period, whether 
their chosen strategies improved their performance. If yes, they will increase the 
likelihood of the chosen ones again in the next period. If no, they will decrease the 
likelihood accordingly. The probability of choosing innovation 𝑞𝑖(𝑡) and imitation 1 −
𝑞𝑖(𝑡), and the probability of choosing imitation target 𝑝𝑖
𝑗(𝑡) are strategically adjusted 
overtime through agents’ adaptive learning from time to time. They are endogenous 
decision behavior of agents on microscopic level.  
Design Concepts – Prediction  
Agents form a probability of choosing each KM strategy and each other agent. Through 
learning and adaptation, they constantly adjust these two probabilities. They make next 
decision based on such probabilistic predictions. Hence, the prediction is realized by 
probabilistic decision-making.  
Design Concepts – Sensing  
If agents successfully connect to the social network, they can sense other agents who 
belong to the same group and who belong to the different group. Hence, they can choose 
the agent strategically for social learning. 
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Design Concepts – Interaction 
Agents when connect to the social network, they can sense and search for other agents. 
For example, when agent 𝑖 choose, agent 𝑗, agent 𝑗’s solution for agent 𝑖’s chosen task 
will be shared. If agent 𝑖  adopts the shared knowledge and improves individual 
performance, he/she will increase the probability of choosing agent 𝑗 again in the future. 
The higher the chosen probability is the more likely agent 𝑖 will interact with agent 𝑗.  
Design Concepts – Stochasticity   
There are two stochastic processes: one on assigning tasks for problem solving through 
KM, and the other on the dynamic movement of goals. When agent 𝑖 chooses to innovate, 
a random task is assigned to him/her, under certain probability controlled by the 
administrator, he/she can create a new knowledge, and this new knowledge is randomly 
produced by the computer. Likewise, if agent 𝑖 chooses to imitation, a random task is 
assigned to him/her, under certain probability controlled by the administrator, he/she can 
connect to the network and choose agent 𝑗, and agent 𝑗’s solution is shared to agent 𝑖 
for solving the assigned task. For the dynamic environmental goal movements, as 
illustrated in Figure 4-3, firstly, the scope of organizational goal is decided with societal 
goal seed 𝑼 as the center and 𝑅 distance away as the radius of a circle – Organizational 
goal scope. Hence that ∆(𝑼, 𝑅) is the set of tasks for the organization; secondly, the 
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whole population of individuals is divided into 𝐺 groups which have independent goal 
scope with group goal seed 𝑔𝑘 as the center and 𝑟 distance away as the radius of a circle 
–group goal scope. This indicates that different individuals solve tasks in different 
domains. As individuals solving problems and moving closer to their goals, the goals are 
shifting as well. It is such a goal evolution that makes knowledge creation and diffusion 
vital. There are two key factors controlling the intensity of environmental turbulence, 
namely how often (1 − 𝜎) and how far away 𝜌 the goal shifts. 
 
Figure 4-3 Dynamic Goal Movements of the Task Environment 
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Design Concepts – Collectiveness 
In the organization, there are 𝑁 agents assigned randomly to 𝐺 groups. For agents in 
the same groups, their sets of goals to the tasks are similar, whereas agents in other groups, 
their sets of goals to the tasks are very different. 
Design Concepts – Observation  
All the data from period to period is recorded and stored in the database for further 
analysis. Data generated from the microscopic level includes agent’s choice of KM 
strategy, choice of selected people for imitation, succeed or failed, individual 
performance, adjustment of decision-making probabilities, etc. Data emerged and to be 
observed at the macroscopic level includes collective decision behavior, organizational 
structured measured by entropy concentration, and collective performance.  
Details – Initialization  
At time zero, agents’ existing solution sets, initial attractions to each KM strategy or other 
agent, the probability of choosing each KM strategy or other agent, assigning agents to 
groups, organizational goal scope, group goal scope, and agents goal sets are all initialized.  
Details – Input Data 
There is no additional input data or external sources used.  
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Details – Submodels 
The microscopic agents KM effort is considered as the submodel. Agent’s KM decision-
making involves two stages: choosing KM strategy: innovation with an endogenous 
probability 𝑞𝑖(𝑡) or imitation with an endogenous probability 1 − 𝑞𝑖(𝑡) and choosing 
other people with an endogenous probability 𝑝𝑖
𝑗(𝑡). Knowledge creation and knowledge 
sharing are two essential processes on the problem-solving perspective (Nickerson and 
Zenger, 2004). There are two exogenous factors representing KM policies that are 
controlled by the policy maker for administrative intervention, namely the productivity 
of new knowledge with an exogenous probability 𝜇𝑖
𝑖𝑛 and the connectivity of the social 
network with an exogenous probability 𝜇𝑖
𝑖𝑚. The purposes are to enable the feedback 
loops or the micro-macro links, explore how exogenous KM policies affect endogenous 
individual decision-making behaviors, and identify what organizational outcomes are 
generated from the bottom-up under such conditions.  
 
4.3 Implementation in ABM 
The pseudo code of the model is attached in Appendix I.  
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4.3.1The Agent Model 
There are N agents in a simulated organization. Each agent 𝑖 ∈  {1, 2, … , 𝑁}  holds 
𝐻 tasks for problem solving through KM effort. The solutions chosen by an agent for a 
given task is represented by a sequence of 𝑑  bits, either  0  or  1 , thus there are 
2𝑑  possible solution choices available for each task. Denote 𝒔𝑖(𝑡)  ∈  {0,1}
𝐻𝑑 , 
𝒔𝑖  (𝑡)  ≡  (𝒔𝑖
1(𝑡), … ,  𝒔𝑖
𝐻(𝑡))  which is the vector of agents’ solutions, and  
 𝒔𝑖
ℎ (𝑡) ≡ (𝑠𝑖
ℎ,1(𝑡), … , 𝑠𝑖
ℎ,𝑑(𝑡)) ∈  {0,1}𝑑   which is agent 𝑖 ’s solution for task ℎ ∈
{1, … , 𝐻}. The heterogeneity of agents is represented by how different their solutions are 
to the same task. To quantify the degree of heterogeneity between two agents (𝑖 and 𝑗), 
the hamming distance is employed as the following:  
 𝐷(𝒔𝑖 , 𝒔𝑗  ) ≡ ∑ ∑ |𝑠𝑖
ℎ,𝑘 − 𝑠𝑗
ℎ,𝑘|𝑑𝑘=1
𝐻
ℎ=1  . (1) 
Corresponding to each task, there is a goal vector ?̂?𝑖(𝑡) ∈  {0, 1}
𝐻𝑑. Note that  ?̂?𝑖(𝑡) 
may vary from period 𝑡  to period 𝑡 + 1  indicating the uncertainty of the task 
environment. Goal vectors may also be different among agents, implying the diversity of 
tasks for different agents. The performance of agent 𝑖 denotes 𝜋𝑖(𝑡) which is measured 
by the hamming distance between the goal and the solution.   
 𝜋𝑖(𝑡) = 𝐻 ∙ 𝑑 − 𝐷(𝒔𝑖(𝑡), ?̂?𝑖(𝑡))   (2) 
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4.3.2 Two Microscopic KM Processes and Evolution 
At each period 𝑡, a task is randomly assigned by the organization to each agent from the 
turbulent environment. Agent 𝑖 has a chance to update his/her solution for moving closer 
to the goal (shortening the hamming distance) by either innovation or imitation. Denote 
𝜇𝑖
𝑖𝑛 as the innovation productivity of individuals, and 𝜇𝑖
𝑖𝑚  as the connectivity of the 
social network. With probability 𝜇𝑖
𝑖𝑛, agent 𝑖 can create a new knowledge, while with 
probability 1 − 𝜇𝑖
𝑖𝑛 , agent 𝑖  fails or stays idle. With probability 𝜇𝑖
𝑖𝑚 , agent  𝑖  can 
connect to the social network and search other agents for social learning, while with 
probability 1 − 𝜇𝑖
𝑖𝑚 , agent  𝑖  fails or stays idle. 𝜇𝑖
𝑖𝑛  and 𝜇𝑖
𝑖𝑚  are two exogenously 
specified parameters in the model as KM policies controlled by administrative decision-
maker of the organization.  
Assuming that agent 𝑖 receives a goal vector ?̂?𝑖(𝑡) and has a current solution vector 
𝒔𝑖(𝑡) , he/she can potentially obtain a new solution 𝒔𝑖
′(𝑡)  by KM strategies - either 
innovation or imitation. Adoption or rejection of the created or learned new knowledge 
is determined by:  
 𝒔𝑖(𝑡 + 1) = {
𝒔𝑖
′(𝑡),   if  𝐷 (𝒔𝑖
′(𝑡), ?̂?𝑖(𝑡)) < 𝐷 (𝒔𝑖(𝑡), ?̂?𝑖(𝑡)) 
𝒔𝑖(𝑡),   if  𝐷 (𝒔𝑖
′(𝑡), ?̂?𝑖(𝑡)) ≥ 𝐷 (𝒔𝑖(𝑡), ?̂?𝑖(𝑡))
 . (3) 
If the new knowledge shortens the hamming distance between the agent 𝑖 and the goal, 
it will be adopted. Meanwhile, the current solution held by the agent will be replaced by 
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the new solution in the agent 𝑖’s solution set. The KM strategy chosen will be considered 
successful. The likelihood of choosing the same KM strategy in the next period will 
increase. Otherwise, the new solution will be rejected. Meanwhile, the current solution 
held by the agent will not be replaced by the new solution in the agent 𝑖’s solution set. 
The KM strategy chosen will be considered unsuccessful. The likelihood of choosing the 
same KM strategy in the next period of time will decrease. The evolution of adaptive KM 
decision-making is a two-stage process. The likelihood of innovation and imitation KM 
strategies is updated in Stage One while the likelihood of social learning targets is updated 
in Stage Two both by a version of experience-weighted attraction (EWA) (Camerer and 
Ho, 1999) learning rule. In Stage One, 𝑞𝑖(𝑡)  denotes the probability that agent 𝑖 
chooses innovation while  1 − 𝑞𝑖(𝑡)  denotes the probability that agent 𝑖  chooses 
imitation. Probability 𝑞𝑖(𝑡) is adjusted at each period on the basis of strategy attraction 
measures, 𝐵𝑖
𝑖𝑛(𝑡) and 𝐵𝑖
𝑖𝑚(𝑡), for innovation and imitation respectively. The evolution 
of 𝐵𝑖
𝑖𝑛(𝑡) and Bi
im(𝑡) is formulated as follows:  
 𝐵𝑖
𝑖𝑛(𝑡 + 1) = {
𝜙𝐵𝑖
𝑖𝑛(𝑡) + 1,              if adopted
𝜙𝐵𝑖
𝑖𝑛(𝑡),                   otherwise
 , (4) 
 𝐵𝑖
𝑖𝑚(𝑡 + 1) = {
𝜙𝐵𝑖
𝑖𝑚(𝑡) + 1,             if adopted
𝜙𝐵𝑖
𝑖𝑚(𝑡),                  otherwise
. (5) 
Therefore, if agent 𝑖 chooses to innovate and then adopts the newly created solution, the 
attraction measure for innovation will increase by one unit after allowing the previous 
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attraction level to decay by the factor 𝜙 ∈ (0.1] . Similarly, the update of strategy 
attraction measure for imitation 𝐵𝑖
𝑖𝑚(𝑡 + 1) applies in the same way. Given 𝐵𝑖
𝑖𝑛(𝑡) 
and 𝐵𝑖
𝑖𝑚(𝑡), the agent then updates the probability of choosing innovation as follows: 
 𝑞𝑖(𝑡) =  
(𝐵𝑖
𝑖𝑛(𝑡))𝜆
(𝐵𝑖
𝑖𝑛(𝑡))𝜆+(𝐵𝑖
𝑖𝑚(𝑡))𝜆
 , (6) 
with 𝜆 > 0 as the agent’s sensitivity to attraction. In Stage Two, the people attractions 
and the probabilities are updated in the same way. Let 𝐴𝑖
𝑗(𝑡) be agent 𝑗’s attraction to 
agent 𝑖 in period 𝑡. It evolves as follows:  
 
𝐴𝑖
𝑗(𝑡 + 1) = {
𝜙𝐴𝑖
𝑗(𝑡) + 1,   if adopted
𝜙𝐴𝑖
𝑗(𝑡),     otherwise
, 
(7) 
with ∀𝑖, ∀𝑗 ≠ 𝑖. Denote 𝑝𝑖
𝑗(𝑡) as the probability that agent 𝑖 is likely to imitate agent 𝑗, 
and it is adjusted each period on the basis of the attraction measures                                   
{𝐴𝑖
𝑗(𝑡)}
𝑗≠𝑖
 :  
 𝑝𝑖
𝑗(𝑡) =  
(𝐴𝑖
𝑗
(𝑡))𝜆
∑ (𝐴
𝑖
𝑗
(𝑡))𝜆𝑗≠𝑖
  , (8) 
where 𝜆 > 0 is the sensitivity to attraction. Endogenously derived 𝑞𝑖(𝑡) and 𝑝𝑖
𝑗(𝑡), 
and exogenously given parameters 𝜇𝑖
𝑖𝑛 and 𝜇𝑖
𝑖𝑚 are crucial factors for understanding 
the KM behavior of the individual agents and the whole organization. 
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4.3.3 The Organization 
The organization model controlled by administrative decision-maker has two functions, 
namely setting goals and dividing groups for the member agents, and evaluating the 
macroscopic outcomes, e.g. collective decision behavior, organizational performance and 
emerged structure.  
Firstly, the scope of organizational goal is decided by setting the organizational goal seed 
vector 𝑼. The organizational goal scope is controlled by 𝑅  which is the maximum 
hamming distance to 𝑼, so that  ∆(𝑼, 𝑅) is the set of task vectors for the organization. 
As agents solving problems and moving closer to their goals, the goal vectors are shifting 
as well. It is such dynamic goal movements that make knowledge creation and diffusion 
vital. Secondly, in the organization, 𝑁  agents are divided into 𝐺  groups who have 
independent goal vectors determined by the organization initially, which means that 
different agents solve tasks in different domains. Let 𝑎𝑘 be the set of agents belonging 
to group 𝑘 ∈  {1,2, … , 𝐺} and  𝑔𝑘 be the seed vector used to generate the initial goal 
vectors for all agents, 
 ?̂?𝑖(0) ∈ ∆(𝑔𝑘,𝑟) , ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑎k, ∀k ∈ {1,2, … , 𝐺} (9) 
where ∆(𝑔𝑘,𝑟) is a set whose “center” is 𝑔𝑘,, and 𝑟 is the group goal scope. All agents 
in 𝑎𝑘 then have goal vectors which lie within hamming distance 𝑟 to the group seed 
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vector 𝑔𝑘. The heterogeneity among groups is modeled by allowing a diversified set of 
group seed vectors. Since the organizational goal scope 𝑅 is kept large enough while the 
group goal scope 𝑟 is significantly small, agents in the same group would face similar 
tasks while agents in other groups would face different tasks. This is essential to the 
emergence of social structure in the organization.  
The organizational model also includes the evaluation of the organizational decision-
making behavior, collective performance, and the emergent organizational structure 
which are measured as follows: 
 ?̅?(𝑡) =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝑞𝑖(𝑡)
𝑁
𝑖=1   . (10) 
 ?̅?(𝑡) =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝜋𝑖(𝑡)
𝑁
𝑖=1   . (11) 
Shannon’s (1949) entropy ?̅?(𝑡) is employed to measure the emergent structure. With 
the entropy for each agent defined as: 
 𝐸𝑖(𝑡) = − ∑ 𝑝𝑖
𝑗(𝑡) ∙ log2 𝑝𝑖
𝑗(𝑡)∀𝑗≠𝑖  , (12) 
the entropy for the whole organization can be calculated as follows: 
 ?̅?(𝑡) =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝐸𝑖(𝑡)
𝑁
𝑖=1  . (13) 
Note that the larger the ?̅?, the less concentrated the network is. 
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4.3.4 The Environment Model 
The environmental uncertainty is modeled by a stochastic process of goal movements. In 
the period 𝑡, assume that agent 𝑖 holds the current goal vector ?̂?𝑖(𝑡). In the period 𝑡 +
1, the goal remains unchanged under the probability 𝜎, which stands for the stability of 
the environment, and shift under the probability (1 − 𝜎), which stands for the intensity 
of turbulence in the environment. The shifting dynamics of the goal vector are guided by 
the following binomial process: The goal in period 𝑡 + 1, if different from ?̂?𝑖(𝑡), is 
chosen 𝑖𝑖𝑑 (independently with an identical distribution) from the set of points that lie 
both within hamming distance 𝜌 from ?̂?𝑖(𝑡) and within hamming distance 𝑟 from the 
original group seed vector 𝑔𝑘 . Hence,  
 {
?̂?𝑖 (𝑡 + 1) = ?̂?𝑖(𝑡)               with pobability 𝜎
?̂?𝑖 (𝑡 + 1) ∈ ∧ (?̂?𝑖(𝑡), 𝜌, 𝑔𝑘 , 𝑟)   with probability 1 − 𝜎
 (14) 
Note that 𝜌 or less bits of the goal are randomly selected and flipped in the shifting 
process.  
 
4.4 The Simulation 
4.4.1 The Baseline Settings  
The purpose of the baseline simulations is to lay a foundation for the further exploration 
on how macroscopic organizational outcomes are influenced by microscopic individual’s 
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decision-making, under the condition of the environmental turbulence and other factors. 
In the simulated organization, there are 𝑁 = 6 agents equally and randomly assigned in 
𝐺 = 2 groups. For the baseline settings, 𝜇𝑖
𝑖𝑛 = 0.5 and 𝜇𝑖
𝑖𝑚 = 0.5 are deployed, so the 
efforts for agents to create a new knowledge by innovation or acquire a shared knowledge 
through social network are the same. The numerical values of other parameters and initial 
attractions are summarized in Table 4-1. Parameters 𝜇𝑖
𝑖𝑛 , 𝜇𝑖
𝑖𝑚 , 𝜙, and 𝜆 govern an 
agent’s decision-making behavior while 𝑅, 𝑟, 𝜌, and σ control the task environment. 
Initially, either innovation or imitation is equally preferred by the agents. For imitation, 
agent’s attraction to any other agents at the beginning is neutral and not biased as well. 
 
Table 4-1 Notations of Baseline Simulation Setting 
Notation Definition Baseline Value 
H Number of tasks for each agent 12 
d Bits in each task/goal and solution 4 
𝑅 Organizational goal scope 16 
𝑟 Group goal scope 8 
 1 − 𝜎 Intensity of environmental turbulence  0.25 
𝜌 Inter-temporal goal variability 2 
𝜙 Attraction decay factor 0.99999 
𝜆 Agent’s sensitivity to attraction 1 
𝐵𝑖
𝑖𝑛(0), ∀𝑖 𝑖’s attraction to innovation at 𝑡 = 0 1 
𝐵𝑖
𝑖𝑚(0), ∀𝑖  𝑖’s attraction to imitation at 𝑡 = 0 1 
𝐴𝑖
𝑗(0), ∀𝑖, ∀𝑗 ≠ 𝑖 𝑖’s attraction to 𝑗 at 𝑡 = 0 1 
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4.4.2 Simulation Sessions 
To explore how the steady-state outcomes of the organization are caused by different 
exogenous innovation productivities and social network connectivity, a series of 
simulated experimentations are carried out with the parameter settings listed in Table 4-2. 
Simulation 1 and 2 are designed with relatively easy and difficult KM contexts to cross-
check the results with the baseline neutral settings. Simulation 3 to 6 are performed to 
examine how organizational performance is influenced by the increasing connectivity of 
the social network, while the productivity of innovation is fixed low reflecting the fact 
that innovation is more difficult in the reality. The simulation is executed for 20 runs, 
each with the same duration (𝑡 = 10,000) and the same parameter settings, but initialized 
with different seeds for random numbers. To eliminate noise from the randomness in the 
initial conditions and goal shifting, results are averaged over all runs.   
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Table 4-2 Testing Various KM Policies in in Simulation 
Simulation 
Sessions 
Innovation (𝝁𝒊
𝒊𝒏) 
Productivity of New Solution 
Imitation (𝝁𝒊
𝒊𝒎) 
Connectivity of Social Network 
Baseline 0.5 0.5 
S1 0.8 0.8 
S2 0.25 0.25 
S3 0.25 0.05 
S4 0.25 0.3 
S5 0.25 0.5 
S6 0.25 0.8 
 
4.4.3 Simulation Results 
As shown in Figure 4-4 Baseline Collective Decision-making Behavior there is no 
significant difference in results among relatively easy, difficult and the baseline neutral 
KM contexts. For all three cases S1, S2 and Baseline, the endogenous organizational 
decision-making behavior ?̅? shows equal preference on either KM strategy since the 
exogenous policy ( 𝜇𝑖𝑛,  𝜇𝑖𝑚 ) favors neither one; the organizational performance is 
greatly improved through agents’ effort on creating new knowledge and sharing existing 
knowledge, then maximized and stabilized; Meanwhile, the organizational structure is 
emerged from the bottom-up and stabilized alongside the entropy decreases. For the 
relatively easy KM context (𝜇𝑖
𝑖𝑛 = 0.8, 𝜇𝑖
𝑖𝑚 = 0.8), the structure is emerged faster and 
the structural pattern is clearer; whereas, for the relatively difficult KM context (𝜇𝑖
𝑖𝑛 =
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0.25, 𝜇𝑖
𝑖𝑚 = 0.25), the structure is emerged slower and the structural pattern is blurrier as 
can be confirmed through the time variation of entropy in Figure 4-6. For the baseline 
case, the time evolution of the averaged social attraction 𝑝𝑖
𝑗(𝑡) is calculated and plotted 
in Figure 4-7, where the black diagonal grids indicate that agents do not learn from 
themselves, while the light grids indicate a strong social learning from agents listed on 
the horizontal axis to those on the vertical axis. The time change of the structural pattern 
indicates a strong intra-group learning than inter-group learning. 
 
 
Figure 4-4 Baseline Collective Decision-making Behavior 
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Figure 4-5 Organizational Performance. 
 
Figure 4-6 Entropy of Structure Formation 
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Figure 4-7 Intra-group learning vs. Inter-group learning of agents 
 
One of the surprising findings from S3 to S6 shows a non-monotonicity in the steady-
state organizational performance against the increase of social network connectivity. 
When the productivity of new knowledge 𝜇𝑖
𝑖𝑛 is fixed low to 0.25, the connectivity of 
social networks is increased from 0.05, 0.3, 0.5 to 0.8. As shown in Figure 4-8 , the 
averaged steady-state organizational performances of the simulation sessions are not 
improved monotonically alongside the increment of network connectivity. Instead, it 
peaks at S5 then falls down at S6. In other words, a high connectivity of social network 
can be harmful to the organizational performance. In existing KM literature, knowledge 
61 
 
sharing is always highly emphasized and encouraged (Maier, 2007). However, the 
significant finding here suggests that over sharing knowledge can be detrimental to the 
overall outcomes. The condition which causes such important phenomenon is articulated 
in the coming section. Note that standard deviations of organizational performance keep 
nearly constant as shown in error bars (less than 0.28), inferring that the discovered non-
monotonicity is robust and reliable.  
 
 
Figure 4-8 Non-Monotonicity of Organizational Performance in Simulation 
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4.5 Behavioral Experiments 
4.5.1 The Computer-Aided Gaming Sessions 
The purposes of the computer-aided behavioral experiments include verification of the 
developed agent-based model on the macroscopic organization level; observation of 
human behaviors in the reality for model improvement on the microscopic agent level; 
and identification of factors and conditions that may potentially and crucially influence 
the human decision-making and organizational outcomes. The experiment is designed as 
an online game challenged by human participants. A gaming software is developed in 
accordance with the same configurations and flows as those in the agent-based model 
shown in Figure 4-1. It is written in Java and has four modules including player interface, 
control panel, computational engine and database. Player interface allows participants to 
manage their accounts, utilize the real-time gaming information to form strategies, and 
experience a competition and cooperation environment. Screenshots of the game interface 
are shown in Figure 4-9. Like agents in ABM, each participant has to compete with one 
and another making KM efforts to gain the highest score. Control panel allows the game 
administrator to manipulate parameters, game rounds and information access rights. 
Computational engine is responsible for task allocation, hamming distance evaluation, 
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player score calculation, and environmental turbulence generation. Lastly the database 
stores all the events and transactions for analysis. 
 
 
Figure 4-9 Screenshots of the Gaming Software User Interface 
 
Figure 4-10 Snapshots of the Behavioral Experiments 
 
The gaming sessions are executed in the same settings with the simulation sessions except 
the one with relatively difficult KM context (𝜇𝑖
𝑖𝑛 = 0.25, 𝜇𝑖
𝑖𝑚 = 0.25) because results 
would be unreliable in consideration of the possible frustrated emotional reactions of 
players. Thus, there are six gaming sessions played in total as shown in Table 4-3. Thirty-
six graduate students coming from the Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of 
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Sciences participated in the experiment as volunteers. For one gaming session, six players 
are randomly divided into two groups. Figure 4-10 are selected snapshots of the 
behavioral experiments.  
 
Table 4-3 Parameters Specified in Different Gaming Sessions 
Gaming Sessions Innovation (𝝁𝒊
𝒊𝒏) 
Productivity of New Solution 
Imitation (𝝁𝒊
𝒊𝒎) 
Connectivity of Social Network 
Game 1 0.8 0.8 
Game 2 0.5 0.5 
Game 3 0.25 0.05 
Game 4 0.25 0.3 
Game 5 0.25 0.5 
Game 6 0.25 0.8 
 
Since the timespan in the experiment is completely different from the simulation, 
deciding the number of rounds for each game is crucial. Several trial games were played 
for round number determination and game software testing. Finally, 80 rounds for Game 
1 to 2 and 200 rounds for Game 3 to 6 are decided, since they are sufficient to reach the 
steady-state for evaluation and economically affordable in terms of time and manpower. 
Meanwhile, to shorten the individual searching and testing time when forming strategies, 
participants are informed with 𝜇𝑖
𝑖𝑛 and 𝜇𝑖
𝑖𝑚 in advance. They are also clear that players 
in the same group are assigned with similar tasks while players in the other group have 
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far different ones. In other words, at the beginning of the game, participants understand 
that intra-group learning is more efficient than inter-group learning. In contrast, only 
through numerous iterations of reinforcement learning can such insight be realized by 
autonomous agents in the simulation.  
 
4.5.2 Results of the Experiments 
One result of gaming sessions, from the baseline Game 2, is shown in Figure 4-11. This 
indicates that along with participants’ KM effort on innovation or imitation, the 
organizational performance is improved gradually, then it reaches a peak and stays 
stabilized. This progress qualitatively agrees with the simulation result but shows a much 
faster convergence to the steady state. This means that the pre-game briefing session with 
information on  𝜇𝑖
𝑖𝑛 and 𝜇𝑖
𝑖𝑚  and group task differences is necessary and effective. 
Different from the simulation, organizational performance in the steady state is lower and 
more fluctuated. The reason can possibly lie in low human engagement, poor learning 
efficiency, and fatigue. Heuristics rather than perfect rationality in decision making can 
also be the cause.   
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Figure 4-11 Organizational Performance in Game 2 
 
At the steady state, the structural pattern is captured in Figure 4-12 for Game 2, revealing 
that players with similar goals hold higher tendency to learn among each other instead of 
reaching out for solutions in the other group. Bubble size indicates the frequency which 
players on horizontal axis choose players on vertical axis. The larger the bubble, the 
stronger the social learning is. Two distinct groups A and B can be identified. Although 
there is some noise caused by inter-group learning, the overall pattern matches the 
simulation results (Figure 4-7) well. The dynamics of structure emergence is illustrated 
in Figure 4-13 revealing the adaptation and adjustment of the inter-group learning and 
intra-group learning among agents.  
67 
 
 
Figure 4-12 Emergent Social Structure and Social Learning 
 
 
Figure 4-13 Dynamics of Structure Emergence 
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After the completion of G3 to G6, each long term steady-state organizational performance 
is calculated and plotted in Figure 4-14, showing a non-monotonicity as well, similar but 
stronger than the one in the simulation. With low innovation productivity, gradually 
increasing the connectivity of the social network can enhance the collective performance 
until a certain point, however, when further increased, it can be harmful to the 
organizational performance. Moreover, the noteworthy turning point (𝜇𝑖
𝑖𝑛 = 0.25, 𝜇𝑖
𝑖𝑚 =
0.5) is in accordance with the simulation, except that standard deviations are larger. 
 
 
Figure 4-14 Non-Monotonicity of Organizational Performance in Experiments. 
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4.6 Results Comparison and Discussion 
4.6.1 Results on Environmental Influences  
Interestingly, results from both simulation and gaming sessions reveal non-monotonicity 
in organizational performance alongside social network connectivity increments. In other 
words, organizational performance is not enhanced and optimized by either innovation or 
imitation alone, but both. When the innovation productivity is fixed to 𝜇𝑖
𝑖𝑛 = 0.25 , 
increasing social network connectivity as 𝜇𝑖
𝑖𝑚 = 0.05,  𝜇𝑖
𝑖𝑚 = 0.3,  𝜇𝑖
𝑖𝑚 = 0.5, 𝜇𝑖
𝑖𝑚 =
0.8 not always allows the organizational performance to continually strike. Both the 
simulation and the experiment reach a peak in the organizational performance at 
S5: 𝜇𝑖
𝑖𝑛 = 0.25, 𝜇𝑖
𝑖𝑚 = 0.5 and then a decline at S6: 𝜇𝑖
𝑖𝑛 = 0.25,  𝜇𝑖
𝑖𝑚 = 0.8. Now the 
question is why it happens. This phenomenon can be elaborated as the following: When 
social network connectivity is increasing, agents tend to engage more and more in social 
learning, sharing existing knowledge among one another, rather than creating new 
knowledge by innovation, since imitation is relatively easier than innovation. However, 
when social learning engagement is too strong, there will not be enough new knowledge 
created in the organization due to less innovation engagement. Gradually the systemic 
diversity in agents’ solutions is fading away while the environmental turbulence is still 
strong enough to bring in brand new and diverse problems. Under such a fatal situation, 
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the organizational performance inevitably declines. Thus, the non-monotonicity should 
depend on the turbulence of the environment. The more turbulent the environment, the 
more innovation efforts are needed for solving new problems. To investigate the influence 
of environmental turbulence on the non-monotonicity, another set of simulation sessions 
are carried out under a relatively stable environment. This time, the intensity of 
environmental turbulence 1 − 𝜎 is tuned from 0.25 to 0.05, while the inter-temporal 
goal variability 𝜌 is tuned from 2 to 1. With such designs, simulations are performed 
with fixed 𝜇𝑖
𝑖𝑛 = 0.25, and incrementally increased social network connectivity 𝜇𝑖
𝑖𝑚 =
0.05,  𝜇𝑖
𝑖𝑚 = 0.3,  𝜇𝑖
𝑖𝑚 = 0.5, 𝜇𝑖
𝑖𝑚 = 0.8. The results shown in Figure 4-15 indicate that 
the organizational performances under the stable environment continuously strike without 
any decline. Moreover, the overall organizational performances are higher and the 
standard deviations are lower (less than 0.22), because sharing existing knowledge 
among agents is good enough for solving recurrent problems.  
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Figure 4-15 Monotonicity in Organizational Performance under Stable Environment 
 
4.6.2 Results on Human Bounded Rationality Influences 
To further investigate on human bounded rationality impact on individual decision 
behavior at microscopic level and organizational performance at macroscopic level. More 
simulation sessions are executed with various exogenous KM Policy settings (Table 4-4).  
Table 4-4 Further Testing Various KM Policies in Simulation 
Simulation 
Sessions 
Innovation (𝝁𝒊
𝒊𝒏) 
Productivity of New 
Knowledge 
Imitation (𝝁𝒊
𝒊𝒎) 
Connectivity of Social 
Network 
G1 0.25 0.05 
G 2 0.25 0.2 
G 3 0.25 0.3 
G 4 0.25 0.5 
G 5 0.25 0.6 
G 6 0.25 0.8 
G 7 0.25 0.95 
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Figure 4-16 reveals that steady-state organizational performance is non-monotonically 
enhanced along the increase of social network connectivity from G1 to G7 when 
productivity of new knowledge is low. The steady-state collective decision behaviors on 
choosing innovation in Figure 4-17, continuously decrease when the connectivity is 
getting better. The cause of this phenomena is discussed in the later section. 
 
 
Figure 4-16 Steady-state Performance in Simulation from G1 to G7 
 
73 
 
 
Figure 4-17 Collective Decision Behaviors in Simulation from G1 to G7 
 
To compare with the simulation data, more gaming sessions are played by volunteers. 
With the resource restriction, only 15 sessions are played with 90 participants. The 
parameter settings are the same with the simulation which are listed in Table 4-5.  
Table 4-5 Further Testing Various KM Policies in Behavioral Experiments 
Experiment 
Sessions 
Innovation (𝝁𝒊
𝒊𝒏) 
Productivity of New 
Knowledge 
Imitation (𝝁𝒊
𝒊𝒎) 
Connectivity of Social 
Network 
Game 1 x 4 0.25 0.05 
Game 2 0.25 0.2 
Game 3 x 2 0.25 0.3 
Game 4 x 3 0.25 0.5 
Game 5 0.25 0.6 
Game 6 x 3 0.25 0.8 
Game 7 0.25 0.95 
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Steady-state collective performance ?̅?(𝑡) of each experiment is depicted in Figure 4-18, 
for comparison. Because the probability of choosing innovation ?̅?(𝑡) for human agents 
is an endogenous factor, the developmental process is impossible to be obtained. Hence, 
overall ?̅?(𝑡)  of each game is calculated and depicted in Figure 4-19 for further 
discussion.  
 
 
Figure 4-18 Steady-state Performance in Experiments from G1 to G7 
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Figure 4-19 Collective Decision Behavior in Experiments from G1 to G7 
 
4.7 Further Comparison of Simulation and Experiments 
The crucial investigation is to examine whether the human agents make rational or 
behavioral decisions. In the simulation implementation, it is assumed that the computer 
agents update the probability of innovation/imitation based on reinforcement learning 
(Equation 4 and 5), however, in the experiments human agents adjust this endogenous 
probability based on their own tacit assumptions. After merging both simulation and 
experiments decision indicator ?̅?𝑖(𝑡) of each game together. As shown in Figure 4-20, 
although samples of experiments are limited, still G2 can be clearly manifested as a 
critical point with both simulation and experimental results align with each other, 
separating two distinct patterns. On the left side of G2, human agents are not as rational 
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expected and are prone to choose imitation while it is extremely more difficult to succeed 
than innovation given the connectivity of social network is extremely low ( 𝜇𝑖
𝑖𝑛 =
0.25 𝑣𝑠. 𝜇𝑖
𝑖𝑚 = 0.05). On the right side of the G2, along with increasing connectivity of 
the social network human agents are prone to innovation even while it is more difficult 
to succeed than imitation given that the productivity of innovation is fixed low 
(𝜇𝑖
𝑖𝑛 = 0.25 𝑣𝑠.  𝜇𝑖
𝑖𝑚 = 0.3 to  𝜇𝑖
𝑖𝑚 = 0.95). Apparently, human agents have a 
tendency in choosing a strategy that is comparatively more difficult to succeed.  
 
 
Figure 4-20 Collective Decision Behaviors Comparison 
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4.7.1 The Scarcity Heuristic  
From the empirical data obtained from human experiments, the surprising patterns 
indicating Scarcity Heuristic in human agents’ decision making. As shown from the 
literature, scarcity heuristic is a mental shortcut that place a value on an item based on 
how easily it might be achieved or lost, the more difficult it is to achieve, the more value 
that item has (Lynn, 1989). Gigerenzer (1991) further states that the scarcity heuristic can 
ease the cognitive load of making a decision but in certain cases it can lead to systemic 
errors or cognitive bias.  
 
4.7.2 A Proposed Model Modification 
In the original design, a version of experience-weighted attraction (EWA) is adopted to 
update the probabilities as shown in Equation 3 and 4, indicating the higher successful 
rate of the chosen strategy, the higher the probability of choosing it again in the next 
round. To modify the attraction of the strategy for probability updating in the scarcity 
heuristic decision way, a weighting value ∆𝑖𝑛 or ∆𝑖𝑚 is induced which value depends 
on both successful rate 𝑆 of the chosen strategy and the network connectivity denoted 
by ?̂?𝑖𝑚  which is relative to the critical point network connectivity 𝜇𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡
𝑖𝑚 , and it is 
calculated below:   
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?̂?𝑖𝑚 =
𝜇𝑖𝑚− 𝜇𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡
𝑖𝑚  
𝜇𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡
𝑖𝑚  . (15) 
The modification of agents’ attractions to a strategy is proposed below:  
𝐵𝑖
𝑖𝑛(𝑡 + 1) = {
𝜙𝐵𝑖
𝑖𝑛(𝑡) + ∆𝑖𝑛,              if adopted
𝜙𝐵𝑖
𝑖𝑛(𝑡),                    otherwise
. (16) 
where ∆𝑖𝑛 (𝑆, ?̂?𝑖𝑚) = 𝑆 ∙ 𝐻(?̂?𝑖𝑚) ∙ 𝑓(?̂?𝑖𝑚), indicating the lower the successful rate of 
the strategy, the higher weight agents will put once it is successful with a Heaviside 
function.  
𝐵𝑖
𝑖𝑚(𝑡 + 1) = {
𝜙𝐵𝑖
𝑖𝑚(𝑡) + ∆𝑖𝑚,              if adopted
𝜙𝐵𝑖
𝑖𝑚(𝑡),                    otherwise
. (17) 
where ∆𝑖𝑚 (𝑆, ?̂?𝑖𝑚) = 𝑆 ∙ (1 − 𝐻(?̂?𝑖𝑚)) ∙ 𝑔(?̂?𝑖𝑚). Note that 𝑓 is an increasing and 𝑔 
is a decreasing function of ?̂?𝑖𝑚, though the detailed form is unknown and maybe depend 
on individual characteristic.  
New simulation results are obtained and depicted in Figure 4-21 after considering scarcity 
heuristic in the model modification. Qualitatively, the computer agents’ decision behavior 
is closer to human agents’ behavior now. However, detailed and accurate causal 
relationship among weighting value, relative value of 𝜇𝑖𝑚, and strategy successful rate 
needs to be further explored and tested.  
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Figure 4-21 New Collective Decision Behaviors Comparison 
 
4.8 Implications  
4.8.1 Empirical Evidence from Behavioral Experiments  
Experiment offers rich empirical information including human behavioral decision 
making in the real situation. Unlike computer agents, human beings are not always 
stringently rational. As shown in Figure 4-12, only Player 1 on the horizontal axis always 
learns intra-grouply while others all attempt inter-group learning, even the information, 
intra-group learning is more helpful, has been given. Even more surprisingly, Player 6 on 
the horizontal axis learns more inter-grouply than intra-grouply, revealing a strong 
irrationality. Whether the irrational behaviors are due to the curiosity, social preference 
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or heuristics, so far it cannot be confirmed. Yet, it suggests a need for re-examine the 
reinforcement learning rule in ABM. Therefore, the gaming experiment provides a crucial 
support for model improvement in the future.  
 
4.8.2 The Integration of Agent-Based Modeling and Behavioral Experiments 
One of the unique characteristics and advantages of multi-agent simulation is the 
versatility. It can produce emerged macroscopic phenomenon based on the microscopic 
individual interactions and offer internal structure, process and state scalable view of 
results for investigation. In this study, the simulation discovers the non-monotonicity on 
organizational performance alongside the network connectivity improvement which 
cannot be feasibly achieved using traditional costly qualitative or quantitative 
methodologies. Moreover, based on such a versatile tool, policy makers can design new 
strategies and policies for the organization, especially suitable for coping complex and 
turbulent competitive environment as problems become obsolete quickly and 
unpredictably. Meanwhile, unlike field work methodologies, the simulation does not need 
skillset pre-requisites; sacrifice overhead cost; interrupt daily operations or introduce 
panic to employees.  
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The advantages of behavioral experiment are mentioned previously in Chapter 3. 
Although simulation and experiment can be used as standalone methodology, both have 
limitations that can be overcome through integration. The simulation can be used as a 
roadmap for the experiment while the experiment can be used for verification and 
refinement of the developed ABM with supplementary information from the reality. 
When integrated, as demonstrated in this study, both can reinforce and elevate each other 
delivering more insightful and reliable results for evolutionary and behavioral KM study 
and organizational performance optimization.   
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CHAPTER 5 THE EXTENDED KM GAME  
This chapter explains the extended KM game in details. Followed by some background 
investigation on incentives for KM, a conceptual framework is established targeting two 
dilemmas. Then the extended KM is described again in ODD protocol. For the 
implementation, it is firstly implemented in the behavioral experiments with human 
participants. The conceptual framework is tested, four cases experimenting different 
administrative KM policies are conducted, and the empirical data is obtained and 
analyzed, based on which the agent-based model on extended KM game is preliminarily 
developed and executed.  
 
5.1 Background   
On top of the basic game, an extended KM game introducing an administrative incentive 
system, namely a payoff function to knowledge creation and sharing is developed. An 
incentive is a notion that motivates an individual to perform an action. The study of 
incentive policies is central to the study of all economic activities: both on individual 
decision-making and intra-organization cooperation vs. competition. Ultimately, 
incentives aim to provide value for money and contribute to organizational success (CIPD 
House, 2013). Administrative policy-makers always strive to establish KM incentive 
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policy that is both suitable for maximizing organizational performance and fair for 
motivating the agents. Such policy should have the following features: good efforts pays 
off; every agent has the equal chance to be the top player; and bottom player has the 
chance to bounce back. However, many difficulties are confronting administrators, for 
example, how much reward should be allocated on each KM action? What is the relative 
reward tradeoff between innovation and imitation? When should adjust this ratio? How 
to promote good competition while maintaining a minimal level of cooperation? What 
conditions change the incentive effectiveness? Through the extended KM game with 
behavioral experiments and agent-based simulation, such complex and unknown 
mechanism can be elucidated. The extended KM game acts as an application for 
facilitating policy-makers to gain better understanding of the internal KM effort, 
introduce administrative policy interventions, and evaluate corresponding effectiveness.  
 
5.2 Conceptual Framework  
The extended KM game is concerned with two dilemmas: loss aversion vs. risk seeking 
as well as competition vs. cooperation. To explain the two dilemma in details and the 
design of KM incentive systems, the conceptual framework is illustrated in Figure 5-1 
and elaboration is as follows.  
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Figure 5-1 Conceptual Framework of The Extended Game 
The basic KM game and some important literature, e.g. prospect theory (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979) and advances in prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1992) imply that 
policy-making without considering bounded rationality and behavioral decision-making 
of agents are doomed to fail. These behavioral economics theories reveal that human 
agents have a hypothetical value function in decision-making that is concave for gains 
and convex for losses, and much steeper for losses than for gains (Figure 5-2) 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1992) and overweight small probabilities and underweights 
moderate and high probabilities event (Figure 5-3) (Kahneman & Tversky, 1992). Hence, 
when implementing extended KM game in behavioral experiments, the key task is to find 
the critical condition for discovering the human attitude towards KM strategies and 
tracking the evolving choices on KM strategies to obtain the weighting value that human 
agents place on each strategy.  
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Figure 5-2 A hypothetical value function from Prospect Theory 
 
Figure 5-3 Weighting functions for gains and losses from Advances in Prospect Theory 
 
Dilemma One on uncertain payoffs: loss aversion vs. risk seeking  
In this dilemma, Innovation has high return (reward: 𝑋𝑖𝑛) but high risk (cost: 𝑌𝑖𝑛) while 
Imitation has low return (reward: 𝑋𝑖𝑚) but low risk (cost: 𝑌𝑖𝑛). Agents maximize income 
by a freedom of choice on either innovation or imitation. If agent 𝑖 chooses to innovate, 
under probability 𝜇𝑖𝑛  which is the innovation capability of agents, knowledge 
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creation can be successful, agent 𝑖 gains high return (reward: 𝑋𝑖𝑛), meanwhile his/her 
knowledge uniqueness  𝑍𝑖 will increase significantly (𝑍𝑖 + 𝛼 ); Under the probability 
1 − 𝜇𝑖𝑛, knowledge creation is unsuccessful, hence agent 𝑖 suffers the high risk (cost: 
𝑌𝑖𝑛). If the agent 𝑖 chooses to imitate, he/she needs to choose the imitation target, if the 
target agrees to share his/her knowledge, agent 𝑖 ’s imitation is successful and he/she 
gains low return (reward: 𝑋𝑖𝑚 ), but his/her knowledge uniqueness will not increase 
through imitation; if the target disagrees to share his/her knowledge, agent 𝑖’s imitation 
is unsuccessful and he/she suffers low risk (cost: 𝑌𝑖𝑛). Whether the target can cooperate 
or not, it is difficult to predict, the initial probability is 0.5 meaning that either accept or 
reject, and this risk can be manageable through interactions. When trust or altruism 
emerged, the probability can grow very high. The extended KM game makes sure that 
theoretically, the expected utility for either innovation or imitation is the same. At the end 
of each time, agent’s performance 𝜋𝑖 and income 𝐼𝑖 will be updated, so he/she can 
adjust the probability of choosing innovation 𝑞  or imitation 1 − 𝑞 in the next time. If 
agents choose more innovation with high 𝑞, they display a risk seeking behavior while 
agents choose more imitation with high 1 − 𝑞, they display a loss aversion behavior.  
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Dilemma Two on Social Preference: Competition and Cooperation 
At intra-organizational level, coopetition occurs between individuals or functional units. 
Based on game theory and social interdependence theories, some studies investigate the 
presence of simultaneous cooperation and competition among functional units, the 
antecedents of coopetition, and its impact on knowledge sharing behaviors (CIPD House, 
2013). For example, the notion of cooperative knowledge sharing is developed to explain 
mechanisms through which coopetition influences the intensity of knowledge sharing 
among human agents (Kimiz, 2013). The underpinning statement is that while 
organizational function units need to cooperate, they are likely to face some competition 
dilemma. It is because being selfish and compete with others is innate human nature 
which can be considered as a default choice of human agents, except some particular 
situation, e.g. with relatives who share the same genes. Under what conditions 
cooperation can arise is the central concern when designing the incentive system.  
In recent years, the concept of 'Coopetitive Knowledge Sharing' (Ghobadi, 2011) is also 
emerged that tackles: 
(1) How coopetition should be conceptualized (Ghobadi, 2012a);  
(2) What forms coopetition (three formative constructs of outcome (goal, reward), means 
(task related), boundary (friendship, geographical closeness, sense of belonging) 
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interdependencies) (Ghobadi, 2012b);  
(3) How coopetition and its interrelated determinants interact and influence knowledge 
sharing behaviors among function units.  
Thus, this topic is getting attention for investigation in the KM field. Based on seminal 
work laid ahead, Dilemma Two aims at utilizing incentive policy to explore the agents 
KM behaviors when facing a competition vs. cooperation dilemma and how they choose 
to interact with each other and how their income is affect by others’ choices. In this 
dilemma, the innovation and imitation payoffs and the probabilities for success 
accordingly are the same with the dilemma one. This dilemma forces agents to decide 
strategically when cooperation is requested. The only way for agents to improve 
individual knowledge uniqueness 𝑍𝑖 which is through successful innovation. There is a 
chance that the knowledge uniqueness 𝑍𝑖 decreases which is through knowledge sharing 
and cooperating with other agents. If cooperation decreases the knowledge uniqueness, 
why should agents accept to cooperate? What motivate them to make such hurtful 
decision? With the knowledge bonus introduced, agents have high motivation to 
cooperate to gain more knowledge bonus even cooperation makes the knowledge 
uniqueness decreases. At each round, a collective knowledge bonus can be shared by 
agents which is determined by the cooperation rate of the round multiplied by bonus unit. 
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The higher the cooperation rate, the large the bonus budge can be shared. How much 
individual knowledge bonus can be gained is determined by agent’s knowledge 
uniqueness. The higher the knowledge uniqueness, the bigger proportion of the collective 
knowledge bonus can be gained. Hence, individual agent’s knowledge uniqueness level 
relative to the organizational average, and organizational cooperation culture are both 
crucial for gaining higher knowledge bonus.  
The decision framework in Dilemma Two is specified as follows: when an agent chooses 
innovation, he/she faces high return (reward: 𝑋𝑖𝑛) high risks (cost: 𝑌𝑖𝑛), and an increase 
in ranking position relative to the organizational average ( 𝑍𝑖 + 𝛼 ). This ranking 
information is one of the determinants for knowledge bonus yielded at each round on top 
of monetary innovation or imitation reward. When an agent chooses imitation, he/she has 
low return (reward: 𝑋𝑖𝑚 ) and uncertain risk (cost: 𝑌𝑖𝑚 ) because the other agent that 
he/she chooses to imitate from has a freedom of choice on whether to cooperate or not. 
The initial probability of cooperate is 0.5. If he/she chooses to share, he/she will have to 
bear a cost – lower the knowledge uniqueness (𝑍𝑗 − 𝛽), where 𝛼 > 1 ≫  𝛽.  At the end 
of each round, agent’s performance 𝜋𝑖, income 𝐼𝑖 as well as the ranking information 𝑍𝑖 
will be updated, so he/she can adjust the probability of choosing innovation 𝑞  or 
imitation 1 − 𝑞  as well as social preference matrix 𝑝𝑖
𝑗
 and  𝑝𝑗
𝑖  in the next time.  
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Agent’s income 𝐼𝑖  is calculated by independent innovation effort, interdependent 
imitation, and knowledge bonus which is determined by both individual knowledge 
uniqueness, and collective social cooperation as shown in the following equation: 
𝐼𝑖 = 𝑞 ∙ [𝜇
𝑖𝑛 ∙ 𝑋𝑖𝑛 − (1 − 𝜇
𝑖𝑛) ∙ 𝑌𝑖𝑛] + 
(1 − 𝑞) ∙ [𝑝𝑗
𝑖 ∙ 𝜇𝑖𝑚 ∙ 𝑋𝑖𝑚 − 𝑝𝑗
𝑖 ∙ (1 − 𝜇𝑖𝑚) ∙  𝑌𝑖𝑚 − (1 − 𝑝𝑗
𝑖) ∙ 𝑌𝑖𝑚] + 
𝑓(𝐵) ∙ 𝑔(𝑍𝑖) 
(18) 
Note that 𝑓(𝐵) = 
𝐶𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡(𝑡)
𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡(𝑡)
∙ 𝐵 is the bonus budget at time 𝑡 where 
𝐶𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡(𝑡)
𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡(𝑡)
 is the 
number of players that accepted the cooperation seeking proportion to number of players 
that requested the cooperation when Imitation is chosen; 𝑔(𝑍𝑖) =
(𝑍𝑖−𝑍𝑚𝑖𝑛)
∑ (𝑍𝑖−𝑍𝑚𝑖𝑛)𝑖
 , is agent 
𝑖 ’s ranking position in the organization according to the comparison between his/her 
knowledge unique with others, where 𝑍𝑖(0)  ∈  [0,1,2] ;                                                 
𝜇𝑖𝑛 is the productivity of a new knowledge is a fixed parameter for each game,  
e.g. 𝜇𝑖𝑛 = 0.25 ; 𝜇𝑖𝑚  is the helpfulness of the shared knowledge depends on the 
knowledge uniqueness between agent 𝑖 and agent 𝑗 using Heaviside Function  
𝐻(𝑍𝑗 − 𝑍𝑖) ≥ 0  𝜇
𝑖𝑚 = 1 ; 
𝐻(𝑍𝑗 − 𝑍𝑖)  < 0  𝜇
𝑖𝑚 = 0 
(19) 
Knowledge Uniqueness 𝑍𝑖 Update is guided as follows:  
If Innovation is successful, knowledge uniqueness increases by: 
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𝑍𝑖
′ = 𝑍𝑖 + 𝛼 ∙ (𝑍𝑚𝑎𝑥 −  𝑍𝑖 ) (20) 
If Cooperation is accepted, knowledge uniqueness decreases by:  
𝑍𝑖
′ = 𝑍𝑖 − 𝛽 ∙ (𝑍𝑚𝑖𝑛 −  𝑍𝑖 ) 
where 𝛼 > 1 ≫  𝛽 
(21) 
Under such exogenous reward policy, agents need to act strategically when facing a 
dilemma between the keeping of individual profit and the optimization of collective 
performance. Hence, the evolving processes of individual behavioral decision making 
against collective performance optimization is visualized. Furthermore, the most suitable 
incentive policy which motivates the individuals and unleash their potential can be 
identified and tested; and the conditions for cooperative and competing behaviors can be 
identified. All the notations and parameters are listed below (Table 5-1)  
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Table 5-1 Parameter Settings in the Extended KM Game 
Notation Definition Initial Value and Range 
𝜇𝑖𝑛 Productivity of The New Knowledge 0.25 
𝜇𝑖𝑚 Helpfulness of The Shared Knowledge 0.5 
𝑋𝑖𝑛 Reward for Successful Innovation 30 
𝑋𝑖𝑚 Reward for Successful Imitation 6 
𝑌𝑖𝑛 Cost for Unsuccessful Innovation 10 
𝑌𝑖𝑚 Cost for Unsuccessful Imitation 2 
𝑍𝑖(0) 𝑖’s Initial Knowledge Uniqueness 0 or 1 or 2  
𝐵 Bonus Unit 20 
𝜋𝑖  𝑖’s Performance: No. of Problem Solved 0 
𝑁 Number of players 6 
𝑝𝑖
𝑗
 Probability of 𝑖 chooses 𝑗 1/N 
𝑝𝑗
𝑖  Probability of 𝑗 cooperates with 𝑖 0.5 
 
To observe agents’ evolving choices, learning and adaptation, social interaction at 
microscopic level and to explore the organizational outcomes at macroscopic level. The 
following measurements will be calculated.   
The microscopic evaluation includes:  
• Individual Decision Behavior 𝑞 
• Individual Performance 𝜋𝑖 
• Individual Knowledge Uniqueness 𝑍𝑖 
• Individual Income 𝐼𝑖 
• Income breakdown: income from innovation, imitation and knowledge bonus 
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The macroscopic evaluation includes: 
• Collective Decision Behavior ?̅? 
• Collective Performance 𝜋 
• Collective Cooperation Rate Coop% 
• Organizational Knowledge Uniqueness ?̅? 
• Organizational Resource delegating to Incentive System ∑ 𝐼𝑖  and its breakdown 
5.3 ODD Protocol  
The extended KM game is described in the format of ODD Protocol as follows:  
Overview – Purpose  
To design the agent’s decision-making conceptual framework based on two dilemmatic 
scenarios with a payoff function; To implement the extended KM game in behavioral 
experiment, gain empirical evidence and observation, and validate and improve the 
conceptual framework; To implement the extended KM game in agent-based simulation, 
utilize the empirical data as input for parameters setting, and generate macroscopic and 
long-term outcomes for analysis;  To identify potential emerged properties e.g. culture 
and norms that may be critical to the administrative policy-making. The specific aim for 
establishing the extended game is to explore how to effectively promote innovation while 
maintaining a cooperative culture  
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Overview – Entities, State Variables, and Scale 
There are two entities in the extended game, namely agents and the organization. Agents 
are characterized by individual performance (number of problems solved), income 
(rewards and bonus earned), and knowledge uniqueness. The organization is 
characterized by collective performance (total number of problems solved), 
organizational decision-making behavior, organizational knowledge uniqueness, 
organizational structure, organizational cooperation rate, organizational resources used 
for KM. To better probe into the relationship between organizational incentive policy and 
agents’ behavior, the content of the tasks is simplified, since it is insignificant to the 
research purpose. In other words, 𝑁 agents in the organization (𝑖 ∈  {1, 2, … , 𝑁}), they 
only need to know under certain probability, innovation or imitation will be 
successful/unsuccessful regardless what kind of tasks they are solving.  
Overview – Process Overview and Scheduling 
At each period 𝑡, each agent needs to choose either to innovate (knowledge creation) or 
imitation (acquiring shared knowledge), at the same time, if the agent is chosen for 
knowledge sharing request, he/she needs to choose whether to cooperate or not. If the 
new knowledge helps the agent improve individual performance and gaining reward, the 
probability of choosing the same knowledge strategy and the same knowledge worker (if 
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imitation is chosen) will be updated and the individual income together with knowledge 
uniqueness will be updated as well, following that the organizational decision behavior, 
structure concentration, and collective performance measure will be updated.  
Design Concepts – Emergence 
With knowledge bonus introduced to the system, the organizational cooperation and 
structure is emerged.  
Design Concepts – Adaptation  
In order to strategically gain more income, agents are actively adapting and adjusting the 
decision-making on KM strategies and social cooperation.  
Design Concepts – Objectives  
The objective of agents is to maximize income gains through KM effort.    
Design Concepts – Learning  
Agents are learning from past experience and also from social observations on how others 
behave and how the collective system behaves.  
Design Concepts – Prediction  
Agents can predict how likely each KM strategy will bring back what outcomes and how 
likely other agents will cooperate with them. They can also roughly predict the 
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organizational cooperation rate as well as their positions in the social system and hence 
how much they can gain from knowledge bonus.  
Design Concepts – Sensing  
Agents can sense who they can learn from and their own relative positions in the system.  
Design Concepts – Interaction  
There is direct interaction and indirect interaction in the extended game. Direct interaction 
is when imitation is chosen. Agents have the freewill to choose who they want to seek for 
help. They can also decide whether to cooperate or not when someone is seeking for help. 
Indirect interaction is when knowledge bonus is allocated to each agents. The collective 
cooperation rate decides how much bonus can be gained in one period. Hence, the 
individual bonus gaining depends on both self-effort and others’ choices. This direct 
interaction and indirect interaction is a key feature in the extended game since it creates 
a social dilemma bridging the organizational and individual interests together.  
Design Concepts – Stochasticity   
The successfulness of innovation is determined by an adjustable probability.  
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Design Concepts – Collectiveness 
In the organization, there are 𝑁 agents. Unlike the basic game, agents in the extended 
game are equal individuals without group identities. To better serve the purpose in the 
extended game, group is no longer essential, hence can be eliminated for simplification.  
Design Concepts – Observation  
Every agent’s decision choices and interactions are recorded in the database. Knowledge 
uniqueness, income gaining, number of problem solved, organizational knowledge 
uniqueness, cooperation rate and etc. are calculated period by period at the real time.  
Details – Initialization  
At the beginning of each game, agents’ initial attraction and probability of choosing each 
KM strategy and each other for social learning are initialized.  
Details – Input Data 
There is no additional input data or external sources used.  
Details – Submodels 
There are two submodels in the extended KM game. One is on choosing KM strategies, 
in other words, the high risk high return one – innovation or the low risk low return one 
– imitation. The other is on choosing whether to cooperate or compete, since for 
cooperation, the chosen agent has to suffer a cost of lowering his/her knowledge 
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uniqueness when sharing the knowledge with other agent, whereas for competition, one 
may gain less bonus since the cooperation rate decides the bonus at each time. The higher 
the cooperation rate the more bonus they can share among each other collectively.  
 
5.4 Implementation in the Behavioral Experiments  
The behavioral experiments for the extended KM game take place in Department of 
Physics, Fudan University, Shanghai, China. There are several reasons for conducting the 
experiments in China using Chinese language instead of in Japan using English. First of 
all, it is easier to recruit many student participants in a short time, so the scheduling 
pressure can be largely reduced; second, the incentive budget for motivating and 
rewarding the participants can be less expensive than conducting in Japan; third, it is 
better to use native language to conduct the game so understanding ambiguity and 
unnecessary noise can be minimized.  
The purpose for implementing the extended game in the behavioral experiments first is 
to test the proposed conceptual framework, gain empirical observations, and demonstrate 
the applicability of the extended KM game for exploring various administrative 
interventions.  
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After considering the time and resource availability, four games exploring different 
administrative KM incentive policies are decided. Game One is the baseline version used 
as a controlled group for comparison; Game Two is designed with a big knowledge bonus 
at each round. Bonus unit is tuned from 𝐵 = 20  to 𝐵 = 30  aiming at promoting 
organizational knowledge uniqueness; Game Three is with reputation information 
disclosing each agent’s past history of cooperation seeking and giving aiming at 
promoting cooperative culture; and Game Four is with diversified agents meaning that 
each agent has different innovation capabilities, e.g. 𝜇1
𝑖𝑛 = 0.1; 𝜇2
𝑖𝑛 = 0.2; 𝜇3
𝑖𝑛 =
0.1; 𝜇4
𝑖𝑛 = 0.4; 𝜇5
𝑖𝑛 = 0.1; 𝜇6
𝑖𝑛 = 0.6, aiming at promoting diversity and organizational 
performance for optimization. Game Two requires financial delegation from the 
organization; Game Three uses information control and social incentives; Game Four 
utilizes human resource hiring strategy to create a diversified mix of employees. The 
effectiveness of each intervention, agents’ adaptive interactions, and collective outcomes 
will be revealed and compared.  
Like the basic KM game, the implementation process includes game preparation and 
gaming software development; participant recruitment, scheduling, briefing, and warm-
up trials; four gaming sessions execution; and data analysis. In game reparation and 
gaming software development, the conceptual framework on two dilemmas is finalized. 
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After settling the aim of the experiments, all the desired features, functions, and user 
interface can be further designed and communicated with the software engineer. The 
gaming software is developed in accordance with the conceptual framework illustrated in 
the conceptual framework. It is written in Python and has four modules, namely player 
interface, control panel, computation engine, and database. The screenshots of user 
interface are captured in Figure 5-4.  
 
Figure 5-4 Screenshots of Player Interface 
There are 12 graduate students recruited to participate in the game. There are another 2 
research assistants facilitating the experiments since they are experienced in conducting 
behavioral experiments. Six participants are needed for each game. Hence, participants 
are divided into two groups playing two games at the same time in separate rooms. Each 
participant played two sessions. They are randomly assigned with different User IDs and 
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passwords, so no prior preference on choosing friends or bias is introduced to the 
experiment. Before formally play the games, all the participants attend the briefing 
session as well as the warm-up trial plays, hence, they are clear about the rules and 
familiar with all the functions and features. For example, when user1 logs in, he/she can 
press start and choose to innovate or imitate bearing in mind that the expected payoffs are 
equal. If he/she chooses to innovate, they do not need to choose people and wait for others 
finish choosing. If he/she chooses to imitate, then they need to choose other agent for 
cooperation seeking. When everyone finish choosing KM strategies, the system will show 
if there is any cooperation request from other players. Based on “Status Info” including 
income gaining and knowledge uniqueness Z, one can choose strategically whether to 
help or reject. At the end of each round (Figure 5-5), a performance, income, and 
knowledge uniqueness changes summary will be displayed for players to adapt and learn 
for next action.  A screenshot of the control panel is shown in Figure 5-6, hence the 
facilitator can monitor the game and remind players if they forget to choose or delay the 
progress. For Game two and four, the bonus unit and innovation successful rate for each 
agent can be changed in the Python code parameter table. For Game three, the control of 
additional information on or off can also be adjusted in the Python code. Once the 
parameters are set, they will not be changed during the game. Each game is played with 
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50 rounds. Roughly it lasts for 40 minutes each. At the end of the game, participants are 
rewarded with cash based on their final income gaining. The player with lowest income 
cannot receive any financial reward as a penalty, however, he/she receive a small souvenir 
for devoting time. The budget for each game is RMB600. If shared averagely by 5 players, 
each can gain RMB120 for 40-mins play, which is roughly two to three times higher than 
the hourly rate for a part-time job. Therefore, it is regarded as a high monetary reward for 
students. During the game play, participants are highly motivated and engaged.  
 
 
Figure 5-5 Screenshot of Individual Round-end Performance Summary 
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Figure 5-6 Screenshot of Control Panel 
Selected snapshot of participants in the behavioral experiments implementation is shown 
in Figure 5-7.  
 
Figure 5-7 Snapshot of behavioral experiments for The Extended KM Game 
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5.5 Results Discussion of Behavioral Experiments  
Appendix II summarizes all the results obtained from the behavioral experiments and On 
the left hand side, there is agent’s data at microscopic level whereas on the right hand 
side, it is the organizational outcomes at macroscopic level. To better compare and 
evaluate the interventions with baseline. Table 5-2 summarizes macroscopic results.  
 
Table 5-2 Macroscopic Results 
 
 
On Organizational Performance  
First of all, comparing with Game One: Baseline, all other cases with administrative 
interventions are effective since the problem solving rate has been improved, meaning 
that the organization successfully solve more problems than the baseline setting.  
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On Cooperative Culture 
Also, the organizational cooperation rate (Coop%) has been improved as well, indicating 
that the interventions are effective on enhancing a cooperative culture of the organization. 
This is particularly noteworthy in the reputation case and the HR diversity case. When 
reputation information is disclosed, agents have a strong motivation or social pressure to 
cooperate with others in order to build a good social image. This finding suggests that 
reputation or social image is a very effective non-monetary incentive to allow cooperation 
to arise. In the HR diversity case, when some agents are very good at innovation and 
having a very high knowledge uniqueness, he/she has the high motivation to capitalize 
the knowledge, cooperate with others, and transfer the knowledge uniqueness to bonus, 
while at the same time, some agents are very poor at innovation and having a low 
knowledge uniqueness, he/she has the high motivation to find the innovative agents for 
imitation. When knowledge customer finds knowledge supplier, the cooperation rate 
increases significantly.  
 
On Organizational Knowledge Uniqueness 
Not all the three interventions improve organizational knowledge uniqueness (?̅?), for big 
bonus and HR diversity cases, the organizational knowledge uniqueness can be very well 
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maintained, while in the reputation case, the organizational knowledge uniqueness is 
fading away meaning that the collective knowledge is blended among agents with a strong 
cooperative culture and knowledge sharing engagement. This makes sense because when 
reputation information is exposed, agents are more likely to cooperate and share out 
unique knowledge to build a good reputation even suffering from individual knowledge 
uniqueness (𝑍𝑖) decrease.  
 
On Organizational Innovation Engagement  
The reputation case shows that it is not an effective intervention for maintaining good 
innovation, since it motivates people to choose more imitation indicated by collective 
decision-making behavior (?̅? < 0.5); whereas big bonus and HR diversity cases promote 
cooperation culture without hurting good innovation.  
 
On Incentive System Effectiveness  
Indeed, Game Four: HR Diversity also serves as an evaluation of the developed incentive 
system. Under good exogenous policy, if one can unleash his/her potential, that indicates 
the very policy works. For example, the administrator controls the innovation capability 
of agents 𝜇𝑖𝑛, which can be seen as the difficulty of tasks in reality, meaning that the 
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probability of success if innovation is chosen. If the endogenous probability of choosing 
innovation 𝑞𝑖  is better than 𝜇
𝑖𝑛 , that is to say, the agent fully unleashes his/her 
innovation potential. After further investigating on microscopic agents’ decision on 
innovation 𝑞𝑖  as shown in Table 5-3 with individual 𝜇
𝑖𝑛  specified in bracket, only 
agent 2 did not choose innovation as much as he/she could do, others all demonstrated 
innovation capability, hence, the incentive system can be regarded as effective.  
Table 5-3 HR Diversity Case Microscopic Results 
 
However, there is a design deficiency in Game Four that need to be admitted. When 
assigning different agent innovation capacity 𝜇𝑖𝑛, for stringent comparison with other 
cases, the average  𝜇𝑖𝑛̅̅ ̅̅  should be the same with other cases ( 𝜇𝑖𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ = 0.25 ). Such 
deficiency may cause bias or errors to the findings, hence, it needs to be eliminated by 
redesigning the parameters and by repetition of the game in future work to gain 
statistically significant data.  
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In summary, the developed incentive system is preliminarily to be proven effective, yet 
future work still needs to continue. Overall, the most cost-effective administrative 
intervention for enhancing and balancing all aspects of the organizational outcome is the 
HR diversity policy. The finding suggests that it is beneficial for organization if 
administrator hires employees with diversified innovation capability. It also suggests that 
diversity is crucially important for the complex adaptive system.  
 
5.6 Implementation in the Agent-Based Simulation  
Following the behavioral experiments, the baseline game has been preliminarily modeled 
and implemented in the agent-based simulation. All the functions and features follow the 
conceptual framework illustrated in extended KM game. However, three variables 
indicating agent’s adaptive decision-making, namely probability of choosing KM strategy 
𝑞𝑖, probability of choosing imitation target 𝑝𝑖
𝑗
 and probability of cooperation 𝑟, since 
they are more complicated and difficult to be determined than the ones in the basic KM 
game.   
For the adaptive learning on choosing KM strategy and adjustment of probability 𝑞𝑖, 
agents still follows experience-weighted attraction (EWA) learning, updating the strategy 
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attraction factors at each round. However, the extended game has an incentive system that 
use monetary income to motivate agents for strategic choosing the better options. Hence, 
a condition is added to the learning rule, that is: if the current round income is less than 
the recent 5 rounds’ average, the strategy attraction factor 𝐵𝑖
𝑖𝑛  for innovation and 
𝐵𝑖
𝑖𝑚 for imitation will not be updated. 5 rounds can be adjustable, indicating agents’ 
memory. In other words, only recent 5 rounds’ income information can be influential to 
agents’ adaptive learning for next round. For probability of choosing imitation target 𝑝𝑖
𝑗
, 
there is no need to add conditions. Based on previous attraction to each target factor 𝐴𝑖
𝑗
 
makes much sense, meaning that if agent 𝑗 helped agent 𝑖 successfully improve the 
performance, agent 𝑗’s attraction to agent 𝑖 in the next round will increase by one unit.  
For the probability of choosing to cooperation 𝑟 , based on behavioral experiment 
empirical evidence shown in Figure 5-8, agents mostly choose to cooperate when their 
own knowledge uniqueness 𝑍𝑖  is higher than the organizational average 𝑍𝑎𝑣𝑔 , while 
choose to reject when their own knowledge uniqueness 𝑍𝑖  is lower than the 
organizational average 𝑍𝑎𝑣𝑔. Hence, the probability of choosing to cooperation 𝑟, is a 
rule-based adjustment.  
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Figure 5-8 Frequency of Cooperation with Reference on Knowledge Uniqueness 
 
5.7 Results of the Agent-Based Simulation   
Preliminary results are generated from the Agent-Based Simulation. Each game is run 
with 1000 rounds. Results are averaged over 10 runs to avoid randomness. Figure 5-9, 
Figure 5-10, and Figure 5-11 are the baseline case results. Organizational Knowledge 
Uniqueness, Individual Knowledge Uniqueness, and Individual Income are steadily 
improved while agents choosing innovation and imitation. Shown in Figure 5-12 , in the 
organization, after roughly about 200 rounds, specialization has been identified, meaning 
that some agents are specialized in innovation while others are specialized in imitation. 
More in-depth and detailed investigations on Agent-Based Simulation results are needed 
in the future work.  
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Figure 5-9 Organizational Knowledge Uniqueness in Baseline Case 
 
Figure 5-10 Individual Knowledge Uniqueness in Baseline Case 
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Figure 5-11 Individual Income in Baseline Case 
 
Figure 5-12 Individual Probability of Choosing Innovation in Baseline Case 
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The results of Game Two with Big Bonus (from 𝐵 = 20 to 𝐵 = 30) and Game Four 
with HR Diversity (𝜇1
𝑖𝑛 = 0.1; 𝜇2
𝑖𝑛 = 0.6; 𝜇3
𝑖𝑛 = 0.1; 𝜇4
𝑖𝑛 = 0.4; 𝜇5
𝑖𝑛 = 0.1; 𝜇6
𝑖𝑛 = 0.2) are 
also presented below. However, Game Three with Reputation, is extremely difficult to 
model at the moment. Hence, it is expected to be achieved in the future study. From the 
simulation charts obtained from three cases (listed below from Figure 5-13 to Figure 5-20), 
we can identify the similar findings, for instance, the knowledge uniqueness and income 
value in HR diversity case are the highest. However, further investigation is needed, and 
the model verification needs to be done as well.  
 
Figure 5-13 Organizational Knowledge Uniqueness in Big Bonus Case 
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Figure 5-14 Individual Knowledge Uniqueness in Big Bonus Case 
 
Figure 5-15  Individual Income in Big Bonus Case 
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Figure 5-16 Individual Probability of Choosing Innovation in Big Bonus Case 
 
Figure 5-17 Organizational Knowledge Uniqueness in HR Diversity Case 
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Figure 5-18 Individual Knowledge Uniqueness in HR Diversity Case 
 
Figure 5-19 Individual Income in HR Diversity Case 
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Figure 5-20 Individual Probability of Choosing Innovation in HR Diversity Case 
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CHAPTER 6 DISCUSSION 
This chapter summarizes the findings and discusses the embedded micro-macro links in 
this study. It further highlights the advantages of the integrated KM methodology, and 
how it can particularly serve the purpose of coping with growing complexity, 
environmental uncertainty, human bounded rationality, and incentive system.  
 
6.1 Summary of Findings  
Through the development of the basic and extended KM games, this study 
has made several significant and original findings which include: 
(1) It identified a non-monotonicity on macroscopic steady state 
organizational performance alongside improvement of social network 
connectivity under turbulent environmental influence, implying that too 
much knowledge sharing engagement can be harmful for organization 
when the environment is turbulent.  
(2) It revealed a scarcity heuristic decision behavior at microscopic level 
indicating policy maker at macroscopic level without the consideration of 
human decision behaviors will not be effective or will have counter-
effective outcomes.  
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(3) An effective incentive system was established successfully. Through the 
design of knowledge bonus, it wisely links the self-interest agents at the 
microscopic level to the consideration of organizational benefit at the 
macroscopic level. Thus, the cooperation arises for gaining indirect benefit. 
(4) Social interactions and interdependency were incorporated in all four 
cases, but it was especially highlighted in reputation building when doing 
knowledge sharing, implying that too much cooperation can be good for 
reputation building at microscopic level, but harmful for macroscopic 
outcomes, then in return, harmful for agents at microscopic level indirectly. 
 
6.2 Micro-Macro Links  
The design of the conceptual models in both basic and extended KM game 
contain key feature that link the micro-macro world. Through the dissertation, 
the microscopic KM effort impact on macroscopic outcomes are highlighted 
many times, e.g. the scarcity heuristic decision making found in the basic KM 
game, which implies that policy without considering microscopic reactions 
will not work effectively. In this discussion, it is argued that the proposed 
study not only has bottom-up micro-macro links, but also top-down macro-
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micro links. The basic KM game studies the environmental influence as the 
conditions and the heuristics of human agents at microscopic level; whereas 
the extended KM game centers the macroscopic incentive systems and impact 
on microscopic social interactions and interdependencies. Moreover, 
information disclosure of the collective performance is also considered as 
macro-micro link affecting the decision behavioral of agents at microscopic 
level.  
In the basic KM game, the exogenous administrative policies on productivity 
of new knowledge 𝜇𝑖𝑛  and the connectivity of the social network 𝜇𝑖𝑚  are 
specified at the macroscopic level for agents to adjust themselves through 
endogenous adaptation and learning at microscopic level. In the extended KM 
game, agents at microscopic level behave differently with different incentive 
interventions specified at macroscopic level. For instance, will the agent 
chooses innovation more often if knowledge bonus increases, will the agent 
choose to cooperate with others if his/her knowledge uniqueness is higher 
than the average, will the agent suffer a little cost to cooperate in the short-
run for possibly gaining larger bonus in the long run? These questions can be 
answered by the KM game. It is argued that these micro-macro two way 
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dynamics can only be caught through the integrated KM approach with ABM 
simulation and behavioral experiments.  
To highlight, in this study, the developed integrated KM approach has 
demonstrated powerfulness and uniqueness especially in coping with growing 
complexity and uncertainty as well as building micro-macro links and 
understandings.  
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CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
This chapter provides a summary of the achievements through the development of two 
KM games and implementations in both ABM simulation and behavioral experiments 
together with the results obtained in the overall study. The significance and contribution 
of the work to the relevant literature are highlighted. Future work opportunities in the 
short-run and long-run are suggested.  
 
7.1 Achievements 
To summarize, in this study, a basic KM game was designed to achieve the primary goals. 
An integrated KM methodology combining agent-based simulation and behavioral 
experiments was developed and verified. The impact of microscopic KM efforts on 
macroscopic outcomes on organizational performance and structure topology is 
elucidated. KM policy took consideration of environmental uncertainty and human 
bounded rationality were evaluated by revealing a steady-state non-monotonicity in 
organizational performance when enhancing the connectivity of agents and scarcity 
heuristics for agents’ attitude toward more difficult KM strategy. Then additional goals to 
induce an incentive system and to probe into two dilemmas (loss aversion vs. risk seeking 
and competition vs. cooperation) on agents’ endogenous behaviors against exogenous 
123 
 
KM policy-making has been preliminarily achieved. Furthermore, administrative 
interventions on promoting innovation, cooperative culture, and diversity have been 
identified and evaluated. agent-based simulation guided behavioral experiments and 
expanded the investigation capacities by offering optimization and long-term prediction, 
whereas behavioral experiments provided model verification and modification with 
empirical evidence. Such integrated approach demonstrated powerfulness and versatility 
in explaining various casual relationships, conditions, and effectiveness of interventions.  
 
7.2 Significance and Contributions  
Theoretically, this research work is the first of its kind combing agent-based simulation 
with behavioral experiments in the KM discipline. Methodologically, it offers a powerful 
and rigorous methodological alternative to cope with growing complexity that 
conventional approaches are unable to. Practically, it delivers descriptive and prescriptive 
outcomes including state and dynamics, long term and short term development, evolution 
and behaviors, etc., for organizational policy-makers to experiment administrative 
interventions, forecast consequences, generate unforeseeable emergence, and evaluate the 
managerial effectiveness easily. It serves as a roadmap that make the cause and effect 
more understandable, hence, new organizational theories can be derived. In summary, this 
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study bridges the theoretical, methodological, and practical gap in the existing literature.  
 
7.3 Future Work  
In the future work, short-term and long-term research missions and outlook are suggested.  
In the short-term, since the extended KM game only gains preliminary results in both 
behavioral experiments and ABM simulation, more repetition sets of behavior 
experiments are needed to eliminate the deficiencies, assure the data quality and 
significance, and the adaptive learning model in the agent-based simulation needs to be 
more sophisticated utilizing empirical evidence.  
In the long-term, the KM game will be further improved by incorporating the freewill, 
learning, and adaptation of the administrator, hence the co-evolution between the 
organization and member agents can be realized. Furthermore, the knowledge should 
enhance agents’ cognition, behavior, and performance, meanwhile agents should re-shape, 
reuse, and renew the knowledge, whereas the organization whether through the 
administrator or itself should actively adjust the conditions that facilitate the dynamics 
and growth, so that the co-construction of the reality among knowledge, agents, and the 
organization will also be possibly achieved. With such an integrated development, the 
managerial insight can be gained, various causal relations can be sorted, and the effective 
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KM policies can be designed and tested before execution in the real workplace without 
sacrificing huge cost or introducing undesired risks.  
Ultimately, with the development of sophisticated KM games integrating powerful agent-
based simulation and unique behavioral experiments, a new field of study on evolutionary 
and behavioral KM will be established, theory will be advanced, methodology will be 
sophisticated, and applications will be abundant. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX I Pseudo Code of the KM Game 
 
def Agent_Model (i, t): 
variable (?̂?𝑖(𝑡) ∈  {0,  1}
𝐻𝑑,   ?̂?𝑖(𝑡) ≡  (?̂?𝑖
1(𝑡),  … , ?̂?𝑖
𝐻(𝑡)) # agent goal 
variable 𝑠𝑖 (𝑡) ∈  {0,1}
𝐻𝑑, 𝑠𝑖 (𝑡) ≡  (𝑠𝑖
1(𝑡),  … ,  𝑠𝑖
𝐻(𝑡)) # agent solution 
vector 
Randomly select a task   ℎ ∈ {1,  … ,  𝐻} 
Draw random number 0< 𝑟1<1 
if 𝑟1 < 𝑞𝑖,      #Innovation is chosen 
 Draw random number 0< 𝑟2<1 
 if  𝑟2 < 𝜇
𝑖𝑛, 
  Create new 𝒔𝑖
′(𝑡) 
  if 𝐷(𝒔𝑖
′(𝑡),   ?̂?𝑖(𝑡)) < 𝐷 (𝒔𝑖(𝑡),   ?̂?𝑖(𝑡)) 
   𝒔𝑖(𝑡) ← 𝒔𝑖
′(𝑡)    
In_Success ← 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 #Innovation success 
  else 
In_Success ← 𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 #Innovation failed 
 else 
In_Success ← 𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒  #Innovation failed 
 if In_Success 
  𝐵𝑖
𝑖𝑛(𝑡 + 1) ← 𝜙𝐵𝑖
𝑖𝑛(𝑡) + 1 
 else 
  𝐵𝑖
𝑖𝑛(𝑡 + 1) ← 𝜙𝐵𝑖
𝑖𝑛(𝑡) 
Else      #Imitation is chosen 
 Draw random number 0< 𝑟3<1 
 if  𝑟3 < 𝜇
𝑖𝑚, 
  𝑗 ←DrawAgent(𝑝𝑖
𝑗
) 
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𝒔𝑖
′(𝑡) ← 𝒔𝑗(𝑡 − 1) 
if 𝐷(𝒔𝑖
′(𝑡),   ?̂?𝑖(𝑡)) < 𝐷 (𝒔𝑖(𝑡),   ?̂?𝑖(𝑡)) 
𝒔𝑖(𝑡) ← 𝒔𝑖
′(𝑡)   #Imitation success 
Im_Success ← 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 
  else 
Im_Success ← 𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 #Imitation failed 
 else 
 Im_Success ← 𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒  #Imitation failed 
 if Im_Success 
  𝐴𝑖
𝑗(𝑡 + 1) ← 𝜙𝐴𝑖
𝑗(𝑡) + 1 
𝐵𝑖
𝑖𝑚(𝑡 + 1) ← 𝜙𝐵𝑖
𝑖𝑚(𝑡) + 1 
 else 
  𝐴𝑖
𝑗(𝑡 + 1) ← 𝜙𝐴𝑖
𝑗(𝑡) 
𝐵𝑖
𝑖𝑚(𝑡 + 1) ← 𝜙𝐵𝑖
𝑖𝑚(𝑡) 
 𝑝𝑖
𝑗(𝑡) ←  
(𝐴𝑖
𝑗
(𝑡))𝜆
∑ (𝐴
𝑖
𝑗
(𝑡))𝜆𝑗≠𝑖
 
𝑞𝑖(𝑡) ←  
(𝐵𝑖
𝑖𝑛(𝑡))𝜆
(𝐵𝑖
𝑖𝑛(𝑡))𝜆 + (𝐵𝑖
𝑖𝑚(𝑡))𝜆
 
end  
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def Initialization[]: 
Initialize N agents:  𝑠𝑖(0), 𝐵𝑖
𝑖𝑛(0), 𝐵𝑖
𝑖𝑚(0) 𝐴𝑖
𝑗(0), 𝑞𝑖(0), 𝑝𝑖
𝑗(0) 
def group {1,  … ,  𝑁} → {1,  … ,  𝐺} 
Initialize organization goal scope (U, R) 
Initialize group goal (𝑔𝑘, r) ∈ 𝐵(U, R), i=1,  … ,  𝐺 
Initialize ?̂?𝑖(0) ∈ 𝐵(𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝(𝑘), r), i=1,  … ,  𝑁 
end 
 
def Evaluation(t): 
𝜋𝑖(𝑡) ← 𝐻 ∙ 𝑑 − 𝐷(𝒔𝑖(𝑡),  ?̂?𝑖(𝑡))  #agent performance 
 ?̅?(𝑡) ←
1
𝑁
∑ 𝜋𝑖(𝑡)
𝑁
𝑖=1     # organizational performance 
?̅?(𝑡) ←
1
𝑁
∑ 𝑞𝑖(𝑡)
𝑁
𝑖=1    # organizational decision behavior 
𝐸𝑖(𝑡) ← − ∑ 𝑝𝑖
𝑗(𝑡) ∙ log2 𝑝𝑖
𝑗(𝑡)∀𝑗≠𝑖  # organizational structure 
?̅?(𝑡) ←
1
𝑁
∑ 𝐸𝑖(𝑡)
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
end 
 
def Environment(t): 
Draw random number 0< 𝑟4<1 
if  𝑟4< 𝜎 
 ?̂?𝑖  (𝑡 + 1) = ?̂?𝑖(𝑡)    
else 
 do 
𝑠′ (𝑡 + 1) ←Randomly flip 1 to 𝜌 bits  
 # turbulence 
 while 𝑠′ (𝑡 + 1) ∉ ⋂(𝑔𝑘 , 𝑟) 
?̂?𝑖  (𝑡 + 1) ← 𝑠
′ (𝑡 + 1) 
 
end 
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def Model(parameters…) 
Initialization[] 
for t = 1 to timesteps 
 for i =1 to N 
  AgentModel(i,t) 
 Evaluation(t) 
Environment(t) 
end 
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APPENDIX II Behavioral Experiments Results in The Extended KM Game 
 
 
 
 
 
 
